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# SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN CUBA

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## HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-SECOND CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

SEPTEMBER 28, 1971

### PART 2

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SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN CUBA

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
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## SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN CUBA

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1971

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS,  
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met in executive session, at 10 a.m., in room 2255, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dante B. Fascell (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. FASCELL. The subcommittee will come to order.

The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 made clear to each and every American the vulnerability of our Nation in a nuclear age.

While that crisis was resolved peacefully, we were again reminded of the continuing threat from Cuba last September when a dramatic warning was issued by the White House concerning the construction of a naval support facility at Cienfuegos, Cuba.

After repeated requests and following a public statement by the Soviet Union denying any base construction, the subcommittee finally received a briefing on the policy implications of this "minimissile crisis" from Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson. We were told at that time that there was "understanding" between the United States and the Soviet Union over the limits of Soviet activity in Cuba.

To bring us up to date on Soviet activities in Cuba, we are pleased to have with us Lt. Gen. Jamie M. Philpott, Acting Director, Defense Intelligence Agency.

General, you may proceed.

### STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. JAMIE M. PHILPOTT, ACTING DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

General PHILPOTT. Good morning, sir. I am the Deputy Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and during General Bennett's absence I am Acting Director.

General Bennett has requested I express to you his deep regret for his inability to appear before you for this very important hearing this morning.

Mr. FASCELL. General, we are delighted to have you here. We understand that General Bennett could not be here. We appreciate your cooperation and that of your staff in keeping us abreast of activities in Cuba.

General PHILPOTT. The Defense Intelligence Agency is here this morning to give you our intelligence holdings on U.S.S.R. naval

presence in Cuba, to describe U.S.S.R. military and economic aid to Cuba and as best we can to talk about the export of subversion from Cuba to Latin American countries.

Mr. FASCELL. Those are exactly the things we want to know about.

General PHILPOTT. You will recall about a year ago DIA presented a similar type briefing to this committee. With your permission, my statement this morning will be in the form of a briefing. The briefing contains those necessary maps, charts, and photographs to clearly show U.S.S.R. activities not only in Cuba but in the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico.

The overall classification of this briefing is top secret. There is actually very little information that we will be presenting to you that warrants that high level of security. Most of the briefing is secret or less. We do have one request. In responding to your questions, should it be necessary for us to use sensitive [security deletion] intelligence, we would request that we do that off the record.

Mr. FASCELL. That is no problem, General.

General PHILPOTT. After we brief the committee today, we will, back in DIA, review all of the off-the-record type information and attempt to sanitize it in such a fashion that it can appear in the record.

Mr. FASCELL. Very good.

General PHILPOTT. I have Major Cassell, who will give you the briefing this morning. He has previously appeared before the committee. He will be assisted by Commander Heekin who has appeared before the committee twice. He is an expert on U.S.S.R. naval capabilities and activities in Cuban waters. I have with me Miss Peed. She heads the Current Intelligence Section of the Western Area Division of the Defense Intelligence Agency and handles all the information on Latin America with the exception of Cuba.

I have Mr. Tilton, who is an expert on the subversion from Cuba to Latin American countries.

With your permission, we will proceed with the briefing.

Mr. FASCELL. Major, go right ahead.

#### STATEMENT OF MAJ. GERALD CASSELL, CUBAN AREA ANALYST, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Major CASSELL. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Morse, I will first present a summary of naval associated events as briefed to this committee on November 24, 1970. I will then describe Soviet naval activities involving Cuba which have transpired since that time. The briefing will conclude with a discussion of Soviet military and economic assistance to Cuba with comments on Cuban export of subversion to other Latin American countries.

Soviet naval combatants first visited Cuba in July 1969 when a *Kynda* class guided missile cruiser, *Kildin* and *Kashin* class destroyers and two *Foxtrot* class conventionally powered submarines visited Havana.

An *Ugra* class submarine tender was also in the group.

The fleet was in Havana from the 20th until the 27th of July. A *November* class nuclear powered attack submarine was also in the Caribbean, but did not enter a Cuban port. This submarine is armed



with conventional torpedoes only. The combatants conducted antisubmarine warfare exercises in the Gulf of Mexico and called at the ports of Martinique and Barbados prior to departing to the western Atlantic.

The second group of Soviet naval combatants to visit Cuba arrived in Cienfuegos on May 14, 1970. Included this group were a *Kresta* cruiser, a *Kanin* destroyer, an *Ugra* submarine tender, a tanker, two *Foxrot* submarines, and an *Echo II* nuclear powered cruise missile submarine. This was the first instance of an *Echo II* submarine visiting any Western port and the first time combatants had visited Cienfuegos. The cruiser and destroyer departed Cienfuegos on the 22d, arriving in Havana the next day.

Mr. FASCELL. May I interrupt to ask a question? The *E-2* class sub is a nuclear-powered submarine which carries missiles?

Major CASSELL. Cruise missile.

Mr. FASCELL. You better define what that means for the record.

Major CASSELL. It is an air-breathing missile that stays in the earth's atmosphere and operates on a jet engine.

Mr. FASCELL. The approximate range?

Major CASSELL. About [security deletion] nautical miles with one change, as you will see later in the briefing.

Mr. FASCELL. Is the *Ugra* subtender different from other subtenders?

#### STATEMENT OF CMDR. JOHN HEEKIN, SOVIET AREA ANALYST, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Commander HEEKIN. The *Ugra* subtender is their latest and most modern.

Mr. FASCELL. That means she can serve nuclear and conventional subs and all the armament that is carried on these subs?

Commander HEEKIN. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. That would be a necessary adjunct if you are going to stay on station with a nuclear, missile-carrying sub.

Commander HEEKIN. Yes, it would.

[Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. [Security deletion.]

Commander HEEKIN. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. How do they service their missiles in the subs?

Commander HEEKIN. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. [Security deletion.]

Major CASSELL. Yes, sir.

All units had departed the Caribbean for Soviet waters by the 3d of June.

Between the 2d and 5th of September, a third contingent of naval combatants and support units entered the Caribbean.

They crossed the Atlantic in two groups. One of these consisted of a Navy oiler, a tank holding ship, a buoy tender, a surveying ship and an ocean rescue tug. Note that the *Alligator* class tank landing ship is carrying two barges on deck. Three of these ships moved westward along the north coast of Cuba and arrived in Havana by the 6th of September.

The other ships, a *Kresta-1* guided-missile cruiser, a *Kanin* class destroyer, a submarine tender and a merchant tanker entered the Caribbean on September 5, and proceeded to an area south of Cienfuegos.

The movement of these two groups is shown on this map.

All units rendezvoused outside Cienfuegos on September 9, and entered the harbor together on that date. The buoy tender and tug were each towing a barge that had probably been off-loaded from the LST at Havana.

[Security deletion.]

[Security deletion.] The barges are about 85 feet in length, 15 feet wide, and have an 8- to 10-foot draft. They are metal hulled and non-self-propelled. [Security deletion.] The two barges were first brought to the Cuban naval base at Cayo Loco, were later moved to the sugar pier and then moored at Cayo Ocampo until December 1970.

Cienfuegos has an excellent natural harbor that is about 10 miles long and 5 miles wide. It is an active commercial port with substantial facilities located in Cienfuegos and a modern sugar loading pier northwest of the city. The channel for merchant shipping is to the west of Cayo Carenas to the northern part of the harbor. I will describe the many other facilities annotated to this map in the next portion of the briefing.

Action was taken immediately after the Soviets entered Cienfuegos to obtain [security deletion] photography. The most interesting result of that mission was disclosure of the rapid construction that had taken place on Alcatraz Island since August 15.

In less than a month, what appears to be a personnel support facility had been established on the island. The new construction included two large structures that may house barracks and a messhall.

New recreational facilities included a nonregulation size soccer field, a basketball court, a tennis court and a volleyball court. A U-shaped pier on the west side of the island has been extensively repaired. A water tower had been erected here.

The buoy tender had placed some navigational buoys near Alcatraz and also laid a floating barrier, made of what appears to be floats strung between buoys. It extends across the deepwater channel that leads to the southeast section of the harbor. This barrier is in four sections as you see here. We have seen one section open several times when Soviets were in port, but the barrier is normally closed. This barrier, together with an existing shoal bank that averages a depth of 6 feet, effectively limits access to the southeast section of the harbor to oceangoing ships.

Mr. FASCELL. No sneak attack?

Major CASSELL. No, sir.

[Security deletion.]

In mid-September, the submarine tender moored to four buoys about 1 mile north of Alcatraz and remained there until [security deletion] late September. These buoys have been at this location since at least [security deletion] 1968. The two support barges were moored alongside the tender.

[Security deletion.]

[Security deletion.] A highway was noted under construction toward this point of land.



The cruiser and destroyer departed Cienfuegos on September 15, followed the next day by the merchant tanker.

The tank landing ship and buoy tender left on September 26 and also returned to Soviet waters.

The submarine tender and the tug departed Cienfuegos on October 10 for the port of Mariel on the north coast. They remained in this harbor until October 31 and returned to Cienfuegos, transiting around the Dominican Republic and back through the Mona Passage. The submarine tender left Cienfuegos again on the 19th of November, and entered the port of Casilda, about 30 miles from Cienfuegos the same day.

She apparently spent her time there at the POL pier, as we see in this photo, and may have been refueled. No significant activity was observed while the tender was in Casilda. It left that port on November 24 and returned to Cienfuegos the same day.

This brings us up to the time of our last briefing before this committee. In covering subsequent naval activity, I will discuss three aspects as shown here (Cienfuegos facilities/further naval visits/other related activity).

Looking first to Cienfuegos, Cayo Alcatraz has remained the same. The facility is shown here on the 4th of August 1971. Personnel were [security deletion] on the playing fields on December 21 and February 19 during visits of Soviet ships to Cienfuegos. Cuban navy patrol boats have also been observed at the U-shaped pier on several occasions. We conclude that the facility is not in use unless Soviet units are in port, but that the Cubans are charged with maintaining it.

The two [security deletion] barges have remained next to the Cuban naval base [security deletion].

The Soviet tug SB-11 has also remained in Cienfuegos except for her short trips to Mariel (November), Casilda (twice), and Antilla (June).

There have also been no further developments on Punta De La Cueva. [Security deletion] the roadbed was completed [security deletion] but was not surfaced. Construction ceased in April 1971. [Security deletion].

Another road has been under construction since mid-December 1970. It leads from Cienfuegos, over the Rio Cauano, and joins the existing road to Rancho Luna. Work has continued at a fairly rapid pace since early this year.

The bridge you see on this photo crosses the Rio Cauano here.

It was completed by mid-July after a highly publicized construction effort. The use of this road will cut in half the travel distance from Cienfuegos to Rancho Luna.

Looking to Rancho Luna [security deletion]. New construction has been noted along the beach. It consists of two groups of three buildings each. [Security deletion.]

[Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. [Security deletion.]

Major CASSELL [Security deletion.]

Turning now to Soviet naval visits since we last briefed the committee, a *Kashin* class destroyer and a *Foxrot* conventional attack submarine arrived in Antilla on December 8, 1970. The *Ugra* sub-



marine tender which had been in Cienfuegos joined the units. They departed Antilla on December 14 and conducted ASW exercises with the Cubans while en route to Havana. On December 21, they departed Havana and transited to Cienfuegos where they remained until December 27. On that date, all three units departed for the Soviet Union. Recall that personnel were seen on the playing fields of Alcatraz on the 21st. We conclude they were from these units.

The fifth visit commenced on February 10 with the arrival of a *Kresta* cruiser and a merchant tanker in Havana. The cruiser departed Havana on the 15th and completed a circuit of the Gulf of Mexico, passing to within 50 miles of the Louisiana coast. The cruiser proceeded to Cienfuegos to join a submarine tender and a *November* class nuclear-powered attack submarine which had been in that port since the 14th.

People were again sighted on the playing fields of Alcatraz. [Security deletion.]

Except for the submarine tender, all ships departed on the 28th and returned to Soviet northern fleet waters.

The tender was in Antilla from March 10 to 15 and returned to Cienfuegos on the 18th. [Security deletion] she departed for the U.S.S.R. on April 2.

The most recent Soviet naval deployment to Cuba began with the arrival of a submarine tender and an *Echo II* nuclear powered cruise-missile submarine in Antilla on May 25, 1971. The Soviet ocean rescue tug SB-11 coming from Cienfuegos had preceded them into port [security deletion]. Both Soviet and Cuban press had announced that an "auxiliary" and submarine would visit Cuban ports—using the plural—to take on supplies and give crews shore leave. We anticipated they would visit Havana and Cienfuegos as had previous groups. This did not occur. On the morning of June 4, the tender and *Echo II* exited the harbor. The submarine submerged [security deletion]. The tender remained out of port overnight but returned to Antilla the following day. A Soviet intelligence collection ship of the *Moma* class (*Archipelag*), which had been operating off the U.S. east coast, joined the tender on June 6. This was the first time such a unit has called at any Western Hemisphere port. Both units departed on June 9. The reason for the apparent curtailment of this visit remains unknown.

In related naval activity, there have been four visits of Soviet Bear D long-range naval reconnaissance aircraft to Cuba. The first three of these visits occurred between April 18 and May 13, 1970. The April 18 flight constituted the first time this type aircraft has been observed landing outside the Soviet Union. The Bear D, [security deletion] primarily a long range reconnaissance aircraft, [security deletion].

The fourth visit of Bear D aircraft occurred in early December 1970. Two aircraft were involved in each of the four flights and all landed at Havana's Jose Marti Airport. They stayed in Cuba for only a few days and there was no Soviet or Cuban publicity attached to any of the visits.

Soviet hydrographic ships have operated in Cuban waters since as early as 1963. Two ships, the *Askhold* and *Zenit*, are currently operating in the Gulf of Mexico and in waters south and west of Cuba.

A Cuban [security deletion] source reports that the Soviets have been conducting research in the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico on currents, temperatures, salinity, acidity, and composition. [Security

deletion] also claimed [security deletion] that the information would be sent to the U.S.S.R. for use by submarines. [Security deletion] certainly the Soviets must have the types of information outlined by the source [security deletion] if they plan submarine operations in the Caribbean. Such information would also be useful for surface operations.

Summarizing this portion of my briefing, we see the recent naval visits to Cuba as part of the larger Soviet goal of achieving a world-wide naval capability. We have seen [security deletion] the absence of new developments in Cienfuegos. However, the support barges, ocean rescue tug, floating barrier, and the personnel support facility on Alcatraz Island remain. If the Soviets were to reintroduce a submarine tender into Cienfuegos, the facility would again be capable of providing [security deletion] support for submarines.

[Security deletion.] Surface combatants can receive limited support from existing facilities in several Cuban ports—including Cienfuegos. Although there are no Soviet combatants currently en route to Cuba, there will undoubtedly be other visits.

Now in the final portion of my briefing, I will discuss Soviet military and economic assistance to Cuba and Cuba's export of revolution to Latin America.

Soviet military shipments to Cuba reached their postmissile crisis high in 1967, when [security deletion] tons were received. In 1968, deliveries were low [security deletion] tons but amounted to about [security deletion] tons in both 1969 and 1970. Shipments are running about the same for 1971. So far this year [security deletion] tons have been off-loaded in Cuban ports.

Most of Cuba's weapons systems predate the 1962 missile crisis period. Military shipments in recent years have largely consisted of replacement items for worn out equipment and spare parts.

[Security deletion.]

The Soviets have also trained many of Cuba's military personnel. However, there is no evidence that the U.S.S.R. has furnished arms or training to Cuba for the specific purpose of supporting violent revolution in Latin America; [security deletion].

Mr. MONAGAN. When you say Castro's earlier guerrilla ventures, you mean outside of Cuba?

Major CASSELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MONAGAN. Of the Che Guevara type?

Major CASSELL. Yes, sir.

None of the weapons confiscated in Latin America over the past several years were of Soviet manufacture. However, some were from other bloc nations such as Czechoslovakia.

[Security deletion.]

Apparently, Castro refused these techniques in the early 1960's when he willingly supported any Latin group with whatever resources he could afford. The disagreement was a prime factor in the Havana-Moscow split noted between 1963 and 1968. However, with Che Guevara's disastrous venture into Bolivia in 1966-67, Castro was compelled to reassess the situation. Events of the past three and a half years—notably the political developments in Peru, Chile and until recently,



Bolivia—have led Castro to believe that a trend in Cuba's favor has materialized and is growing. So long as he can ride the wave of this trend, he will be less inclined to chance an international political reversal occasioned by blatant involvement in violent subversive operations.

This is not to say that Castro has abandoned his convictions on the necessity of violent insurgency in Latin America.

Over the past 12 years, Castro has provided training in Cuba to nationals of almost every Latin American country. He provided direct support in the form of money, military equipment, and in some cases, Cuban personnel—to [security deletion]. Today, we have positive evidence of direct Cuban participation in violent revolutionary activities [security deletion]. This reduction in subversive activities, where Cuba's part is readily visible, may make it appear that Castro is no longer the threat to Latin American security he was in the 1960s. This is not the case. He has, probably with Soviet urging, refined his techniques and become much more selective in offering substantial Cuban support to other Latin subversive groups. But he has not changed his long-term objectives of fostering violent insurgency in Latin America. Today, we have evidence of limited Cuban support of subversive groups in [security deletion].

[Security deletion.] In some cases, Castro's efforts are limited to training of insurgents or propaganda against the existing government. Hence, the Cuban role in Latin insurgency is now much more difficult to identify. We believe these are Castro's revolutionary tactics today: [Security deletion.]

In this last portion of my presentation, I will speak of Soviet economic assistance to Cuba. The Soviet Union has already invested almost \$3 billion in the Cuban economy. Key areas have been the attempts to modernize Cuba's antiquated sugar and maritime resources.

Thus far, it has been a poor investment. Castro has not proved to be an able economist and conditions in Cuba are dire despite the Soviet aid program. It is interesting to note that Cuba has received about [security deletion] percent of the Soviet foreign economic aid for developing countries and has thus far repaid almost none of it.

The U.S.S.R. seems bent on not only upgrading the Cuban economy, but on doing it the Soviet way.

Cuba and the U.S.S.R. established, last December, the Soviet-Cuban Intergovernment Economic, Scientific and Technological Cooperation Commission. Cuba's Ambassador Without Portfolio, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, who signed the agreement for Cuba, predicted "wider Soviet-Cuban cooperation which would enter a new phase." He went on to say that it would require the outlay of "enormous financial resources."

Since that time, at least [security deletion] Soviet administrators and "advisers" have arrived in Cuba, [security deletion].

Construction projects are currently underway in the ports of Havana, Matanzas, Cienfuegos, the Bay of Nipe, and Santiago de Cuba. The transportation net and electric power production facilities are also being upgraded. Soviet Planning Commissioner Nikolay Baybakov was in Cuba for 10 days last May, conferring with Fidel Castro and inspecting Cuban port, sugar, and industrial facilities. The first ses-



sion of the joint cooperation commission was completed this month in Havana with the signing of a protocol by Cuban Minister Rodriguez and Vladimir Novikov, U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers Deputy Chairman. Among the high Soviet officials in Novikov's entourage was Maritime Fleet Minister Timofey B. Guschenko.

The Soviet Union has a deep involvement in Cuba. It seems committed to insuring Cuba's eventual economic success and to providing a suitable amount of arms for its defense. In return, the Soviets obviously look to Cuba for support of naval combatants as well as a show place for communism in the Western Hemisphere.

This concludes my briefing.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you, Major.

Since the last committee hearing on this subject, the Russians and Cubans jointly announced one Soviet visit. The others were not announced, is that correct?

Major CASSELL. They have announced all except the September visit.

Mr. FASCELL. September of this year?

Major CASSELL. September 1970.

Mr. FASCELL. All of the visits since then have been announced by both the Russians and the Cubans?

Major CASSELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. Consequently our policy statement that we would no longer announce or identify individual actions or visits of the Soviet Navy to Cuba and the Caribbean is meaningless. Can somebody tell me why we bothered to even say that?

General PHILPOTT. I cannot answer that question, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. Why would the Secretary of Defense make that kind of statement?

General PHILPOTT. Do you know the details on this?

**STATEMENT OF COL. C. S. FREED, CHIEF, EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
DIVISION, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

Colonel FREED. As I recall his statement, he said he was not going to announce the deployment of individual ships.

Mr. FASCELL. It was something like that, Colonel.

Colonel FREED. Might I go off the record on that?

Mr. FASCELL. All right.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. FASCELL. Let us get back to a couple of things.

We have had joint oceanographic studies with several Latin countries and with the Russians. They have had every opportunity to get all kinds of information. It is the kind of information which is public and readily available. I do not attach any particular significance to oceanographic efforts by the Soviets in the Caribbean. Do you?

General PHILPOTT. No, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. I have heard rumors that there is a Cuban defector who was in their naval intelligence who is about to testify. Is that true?

Major CASSELL. I know only of the sources and the reports that are received in my office. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. [Security deletion.]

General PHILPOTT. I do not know but I will find out and let you know. (A classified document was subsequently furnished for the subcommittee's files.)

Mr. FASCELL. I would sure appreciate it.

General PHILPOTT. We do not get too involved with defectors.

Mr. FASCELL. If you let me know, I will see what can be done about it. [Security deletion.]

I am curious about new names that crop up as possible naval support bases. There are numerous possibilities. I suppose Cienfuegos is the best of those in terms of an actual land locked harbor and facilities, et cetera. The others all have a potential.

General PHILPOTT. Yes, sir. In the Havana area there is a considerable potential. Cienfuegos is essentially a big Pearl Harbor. It is a beautiful place for the type of operation going on.

Mr. FASCELL. What is the significance of the new road? I recall in the last hearings we had some discussion about the new road that was being built there and nobody seemed to know anything about it. I got the idea it was not considered significant and the Cubans who brought back the information did not know what they were talking about. Now it shows up as important new construction. What does its construction mean? It shortens the time between where and where and what does that mean?

Major CASSELL. I think we may have been discussing different roads. As I recall from reading the testimony from last year's hearing the discussion was on a road coming into the Cienfuegos area. This road is part of the regular highway development plan which has no particular significance as far as Cienfuegos is concerned. The road we discussed here is simply a new road being built in the Cienfuegos area. We do not tie it to the Soviet presence. It was a new development that we felt should be mentioned to the committee.

General PHILPOTT. But you can tie a good road to connect the military types of hardware going into the area.

Mr. FASCELL. Surely. There is something else that stuck in my mind. The buoys have been there since 1968?

General PHILPOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. In all of the flap that occurred last year that never stuck out.

Colonel FREED. Sir, when we addressed that last year, as you may recall there was an erroneous statement by Colonel Bridge in the early part of the testimony that those buoys had been recently installed. He corrected it later in the testimony and said they had been there since 1968. [Security deletion.]

Colonel Bridge had not been told that before he appeared before the committee.

Mr. FASCELL. I do not think it would have made any substantial difference in what actually happened. It was just one more peg in a series of events. That is the main thing.

The activity at the Rancho Luna was strictly a field deployment. [Security deletion.]

Major CASSELL. No, sir. Nothing.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Morse.

Mr. MORSE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.



Tell me the significance of the facts that we heard this morning, General.

General PHILPOTT. The significance of the facts that we presented to you today indicates a pattern on the part of the U.S.S.R. to introduce naval type ships into this Hemisphere. The briefing clearly shows [security deletion] other military activity around the harbor of Cienfuegos, along with other construction that was going on. I am sure you have detected that quite a bit of that activity has been slowed down [security deletion]. This information suggests that the Soviet plan for the use of Cienfuegos during this time period probably exceeded what finally materialized in the way of Soviet visits to Cienfuegos.

The future plans for the use of the naval facility we do not know. [Security deletion.]

[Security deletion.] The capability differs from our *Polaris* capability, which means that the pattern that the U.S.S.R. could use in operating *Y* class submarines, the *E-2* class submarines or nuclear attack submarines in this Hemisphere will not necessarily be the same as the tactics and the manner in which we operate our *Polaris* fleets.

Mr. MORSE. I heard all the words in your last sentence and I do not have any idea what you are talking about.

General PHILPOTT. The way that the U.S.S.R. will operate the *Y* class submarine and *E-2* class submarine will not necessarily be the same way that we, the United States, operate our *Polaris* type submarines overseas.

Mr. FASCELL. There is no reason to believe right now that the Russians are operating in a pattern which would allow them to operate and deploy nuclear-powered missile-carrying submarines in Cienfuegos or the Caribbean.

General PHILPOTT. That is true.

Mr. FASCELL. That is generally what we think right now.

Mr. MORSE. Thank you for the translation. I noted in the briefing that the Major said that the economic circumstances in Cuba were "dire." Who can tell me about this?

#### STATEMENT OF CHARLES TILTON, WESTERN AREA ANALYST, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. TILTON. They are dire in this respect, sir: Rationing gets worse every year, but the Cuban economy is not going to fail nor is the Cuban man in the street going to starve at this moment. In fact, the Cubans are careful to point out that people in other parts of Latin America live even worse than they do in Cuba. So by our standards it is dire. Rationing is tough. Many times when you have a ration ticket you cannot get the stuff that is on the ticket. If you want to get food, clothing, ice cream, go to a restaurant, or to a movie, you must line up anywhere from maybe four or five hours to an entire 12 hours beforehand. As for the economy itself, it, and if I get to talking too much, cut me off, has been mismanaged by Fidel Castro. Everybody who reports on the subject claims that he is quite headstrong and headlong. He made quite a study of agriculture, and may say, "We will do this." But often contradictory orders come, or maybe one man



is engaged in a program and the man that Fidel instructed comes to this man and says, "I have to have all your equipment and men because Fidel has told me to do this." Fidel himself does not come around and break up the impasse.

He has been successful in instituting a program of artificial insemination of cattle. It does look a though his cattle program is going to be a success. He had British economists helping him, but in 1969 Castro got into somewhat of a confrontation with him at a meeting in which the British expert made certain statements and Fidel Castro contradicted him. The reason I mentioned that is that foreign experts coming to Cuba seem to feel that Fidel does not follow up his plans in an orderly and scientific way. He gets a bee in his bonnet and insists on going right ahead. The Cuban economy is deeply in debt to the Soviet Union and is deeply in debt to the Western nations. That has created a \$3 billion Cuban debt to the Soviets. A great deal of that Soviet money has gone to trying to finance the Cuban imbalance of payments so they would have some convertible currency to buy some of the things they needed from non-Communist countries. Major Castro has tried to keep his credit good with the Western nations. So when he does give the okay to purchase the equipment and supplies they can be sure the money will be available in convertible currencies. Of course, like any man who operates that way, there are times when he must countermand orders that his subordinates would like carried out because he knows there simply will not be enough money to pay the bill.

Mr. MORSE. Thank you very much, sir. One final question, Mr. Chairman: I noticed on the original map showing the areas to which the Cubans had exported subversive activities [security deletion] was not identified. On the next map which appeared, [security deletion] was identified. Can you clear that up? What is the difference?

Major CASSELL. Sir, I would like to refer that question to Miss Peed.

**STATEMENT OF MARGARET PEED, WESTERN AREA ANALYST,  
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

Miss PEED. The subversive elements in [security deletion] are extremely nationalistic. They do very well on their own. They have not sought any Cuban aid except in training. Possibly 100 or 200 have been trained in Cuba. The reason it was not on the original map is that Castro has never given any direct support to the terrorists in [security deletion].

Mr. MORSE. Thank you very much.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Monagan.

Mr. MONAGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TILTON, hasn't Castro publicly admitted in that long harangue he gave not too long ago that much of his economic program has been a failure?

Mr. TILTON. Yes, sir. You are probably talking about his 26th of July annual speech in which he was very admirably quite frank with the Cuban people and told them where they had failed. He told them in 1970 that their harvest had failed—this gigantic 10 million ton harvest that he had predicted failed because of management, transportation, and labor failures.

Mr. MONAGAN. The analysis that I read, and it is sort of vague in my mind now as to where it came from—it was from a source that was sympathetic—concluded that the rhetoric had lost its force and that the economic motivations that are required in any society for the improvement of the individuals were not there. It was said that that was a major reason as to why the momentum had been lost.

Mr. TILTON. Sir, that is one of those things that you have to study very carefully in any country, ours or Cuba. For example, it is true that a large part of the momentum appeared to have been lost and people were tired out from the extraordinary effort they had put forth. On the other hand, people who go to Cuba and circulate among the people who have benefited from the Castro revolution, I mean the peasants, tell you that Fidel Castro is still tops, what he says is still magic. So these reports that you get depend a good deal on who is talking to you. That is the problem we have in the intelligence business—how to evaluate the right and left reports. I think that our evaluation is that just as would be expected, they have put forth an extra effort in the sugar harvest and disrupted their economy because Fidel Castro told them to. He confessed his own failure and said, "You can fire me," which was a wonderful thing to say, psychologically. There are many people in Cuba who say, "I can earn so much money but I cannot buy anything with the money, so why should I go to work?" So absenteeism is something they all talk about.

The Russians probably have stimulated him to reorganize the unions. He is saying, "We made a mistake in trying to run the people from the top down. Let us bring the people into the unions to make the decisions and see what the problems are and let them help to solve them." So you have a tough situation but I think the populace is still with him on the whole.

Mr. MONAGAN. You spoke about British economic experts. Who were they?

Mr. TILTON. It was Dr. Thomas R. Preston, a British scientist under contract to the Cuban Government. He is a well-known agricultural expert. He was called in early in the game. When I say "early," probably about 1965 or 1966, to help Fidel analyze their agricultural problems and to help him work them out. Take pastures, for example. Is it better to have this kind of grass in a pasture, is it better to fertilize the pasture, is it better to use  $x$  number or  $y$  number of acres per animal?

Mr. MONAGAN. I was interested in knowing his identity; not knowing his name. Was he hired as an individual?

Mr. TILTON. Yes, sir. He was not from the British Government. He was hired as an expert.

Mr. MONAGAN. That is all I meant. Thank you.

General, does all this represent a gradual edging in, would you say— all these operations that you have spoken about—into the Caribbean area?

General PHILPOTT. Yes, sir. I think they are gradual.

Mr. MONAGAN. Even though the submarine has been withdrawn, you have the "Bear D's," the long-range reconnaissance planes which have never landed outside the Soviet Union. So on the whole it is a gradual movement into the area where cautiously—



General PHILPOTT. He doesn't seem to be in any rush. Perhaps in answer to Mr. Morse's question, he has a hold in this Hemisphere and he does not intend to let it go. It is a slow pace. It is very well thought out. We have not seen the end of it yet.

Mr. MONAGAN. Even though the present estimate by your agency is that the Soviets would not now use the facilities for the offensive *Polaris* type of submarine, is there any reason why they could not be used for that?

General PHILPOTT. There is no reason at all. [Security deletion] we cannot rule out that in the future the U.S.S.R. will try to increase this capability in this hemisphere.

Mr. MONAGAN. Are they communicating with us about the identity of these submarines?

General PHILPOTT. They announce the visits. We do not know exactly what type of a submarine will show up at this place or that place, but with the intelligence system that is available, we are able to [security deletion] to identify the class of surface vessel and submarines that are associated with them.

Mr. MONAGAN. So when you said, "if they told us," you don't mean they would be following any pattern they had followed in the past but merely that we had acquired that information on our own.

General PHILPOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MONAGAN. On the hydrographic ships, you indicated to the chairman that at least insofar as the investigative activities that are set forth on the chart, they did not concern you. Don't they have any other functions than studying the sea water or other physical matters such as that?

General PHILPOTT. When I stated it did not concern me, it is one part of a very complicated subject. It is one phase. It is a desirable type of information that the U.S.S.R. would like to have. There is open source information that, on some of the things the U.S.S.R. is trying to collect.

I would refer to Commander Heekin for the reason for that ship being down there.

Commander HEEKIN. Hydrographic research, both Soviet civilian research ships and naval research ships operate in the Caribbean. As the chairman indicated, much of the knowledge gained there is exchanged. However, over the past 2 years we have noted the naval hydrographic ship operating in many of the passages and channels in the Caribbean area.

Mr. FASCELL. Do those naval hydrographic ships have the capability to determine whether or not we have an [security deletion].

Mr. FASCELL. [Security deletion.]

Commander HEEKIN. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. I know that, [security deletion].

Commander HEEKIN. One thing they could be doing is bottom topography; plotting the ocean floors, the current, and so forth.

I think the information they gain is necessary for submarine operations, both offensive and defensive.

Mr. MONAGAN. General, you detailed the replacement with regard to equipment.

Would you agree that most of that is defensive in character, knowing how broad a term "defensive" is, but generally would you say that is so? I mean everything that comes in to the Cubans?

General PHILPOTT. It is basically defensive.

Mr. MONAGAN. When you stated [security deletion] percent of Soviet foreign aid had gone to Cuba you meant economic aid, is that so?

Mr. TILTON. Yes, sir, that is correct.

Mr. MONAGAN. Someone said I believe that there is no direct subsidization of revolutionary activities in other Latin American countries by the U.S.S.R. Still there has been Cuban support of these activities and that would not be possible except for the fact that aid were coming from the U.S.S.R. Perhaps that is a distinction without a difference.

General PHILPOTT. It is not an effort to whitewash the U.S.S.R. They are involved.

Mr. KAZEN. Who is the No. 2 man in Cuba now?

Mr. TILTON. It is Fidel Castro's brother, Raul Castro.

Mr. KAZEN. Has anyone come up to take the place of Che Guevara?

Mr. TILTON. No. He was an individual on his own and they have not put out a man with that kind of thinking or that kind of drive for the revolution.

Mr. KAZEN. So Fidel and Raul are the ones who are really running the show?

Mr. TILTON. The Castro brothers really run the country though President Dorticos is highly respected and is the titular head of the country. Fidel is the Prime Minister and Raul is the Deputy Prime Minister. The President of the Republic is a civilian, Dr. Dorticos. There is no question about who runs the country.

Mr. KAZEN. Do we know how people for instance in [security deletion] get out of [security deletion] to come into Cuba for their training?

Miss PEED. Yes, there are several ways. [Security deletion]. Many Latin Americans, however, go to Europe and then return from Europe; Prague, or earlier from Spain. Many go to Prague and come back that way.

Mr. FASCELL. Prague has really played quite a role in the entire Cuban operation, has it not?

Miss PEED. Yes.

Mr. KAZEN. At one time, General, we were told there was a road being built going nowhere. I don't remember exactly where that road was supposed to be, but it was a multilane road that the witness suspected could be used as a runway.

Major CASSELL. Sir, I believe that the road you have in question is one that was reputed to be leading from the Cienfuegos facility into the mountains to the east. There is no road there. We looked for it when we heard the same comment and the road is not there. There is, however, considerable road construction going on in Cuba having to do with the improvement of the transportation net in general. It is not necessarily associated with this.

Mr. MONAGAN. Could we, for the record, have a rundown by year and country of those trained in Cuba?



General PHILPOTT. We have that information available and will supply it for the record.

(The information follows:)

PERSONNEL FROM OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES TRAINED IN CUBA

Only an estimate of the number of Latin Americans who have received subversive training in Cuba can be provided, owing to the secretive and complex character of the operations. False passports, removable Cuban visas, and circuitous routes of travel are factors which limit accuracy. A listing by year is not available, although it is probable that the greatest number were trained during the period 1960 through 1966.

It is estimated that between 2,150 and 2,500 Latin Americans received subversive training in Cuba during the period 1960 through 1969. A breakdown of estimated figures by country of origin follows: [Security deletion.]

Latin American leftists, insurgents, and revolutionaries are assigned to courses of instruction or training believed appropriate to their individual capabilities. Thus, the training of a politically-minded intellectual might be directed toward Communist theory, propaganda techniques, political agitation, and subversive methodology. An activist might be selected for training in urban and rural guerrilla warfare tactics, sabotage, and the handling and use of explosives. Some trainees receive special instruction in communications and intelligence techniques. All these subjects are classed as "subversive" for purposes of this report.

Mr. MONAGAN. Mr. Fascell has been called out and I am asking two or three questions here for the record that I think he might have asked if he had been here.

First of all, do you know anything about a La Campana missile base near Manicaragua?

General PHILPOTT. May we provide it for the record? Unless someone could answer it.

Major CASSELL. [Security deletion.]

Mr. MONAGAN. Thank you.

(A classified document was subsequently furnished and is retained in the subcommittee files.)

[Security deletion.]

General PHILPOTT. [Security deletion.]

Mr. MONAGAN. [Security deletion.]

General PHILPOTT. [Security deletion.]

Mr. MONAGAN. [Security deletion.]

General PHILPOTT. [Security deletion.]

Mr. MONAGAN. There has been press speculation that the Soviets are getting increasingly rough treatment from their Cuban hosts and there are other opinions that the military ties are closer than ever. What is your assessment?

General PHILPOTT. We have some intelligence along that line. The total assessment of it and how real it is—do we have a position for that or should we provide it for the record?

Major CASSELL. I think we have a position. Once again, I would like to ask Mr. Tilton to speak to that.

Mr. TILTON. The position of the Soviets in Cuba seems to be somewhat analogous to the position of American military advisers in some other countries, wherein they have been called "The Ugly American." They seem to have the same situation with the Soviets in Cuba. They are not liked by the Cubans. We hear that universally; that they keep very much to themselves in separate compounds; that they don't asso-

ciate in work—well, they associate in work, but they don't associate in recreation.

I don't think I am qualified to talk about the closeness of the military to the Cuban situation.

Mr. FASCELL. "The Ugly American," though, was a good guy.

Mr. TILTON. That is right.

General PHILPOTT. We will research your question in greater detail and provide more for the record.

(The material follows:)

#### EVALUATION OF SOVIET-CUBAN RELATIONSHIP

Soviet personnel in Cuba almost completely isolated themselves from the Latin way of life primarily because they look on the Cubans as shiftless and incompetent. They live and play apart from the general populace. The Cubans see their advisers as dour, crude, and aloof. Even in the work environment, most Cubans try to avoid the Soviet advisers and technicians except where their expertise is essential to the job at hand.

Within the military, the situation is much the same with minor variations. Soviet military advisers, instructors, and technicians (presently believed to total about [security deletion]) are usually separated from their Cuban military contemporaries except when performing their assigned functions. Among lower ranking Cuban military there is little, if any, socializing with the Soviets. At high levels of the Cuban military establishment, there are closer, yet cautious, relationships with the Russians. At this level, there seems to be a realization that the Russian expertise is a vital cog in the Cuban military system.

With regard to other government officials, [security deletion]. Cuban reaction, most government officials realize that something has to be done to reverse the downward trend of the Cuban economy. Thus these bureaucrats must at least temporarily accept the Russian presence regardless of their personal feelings.

Mr. FASCELL. I think that might be done on all these. I am just going ahead with them.

General Philpott, have any Soviet nuclear submarines been serviced in or from Cuba? On January 1971 the President said this would constitute a violation of the understanding.

General PHILPOTT. [Security deletion.] You say "surfaced"?

Mr. FASCELL. Serviced from Cienfuegos?

General PHILPOTT. [Security deletion.]

We did point out the E-2 submarine had been there and a couple of other types.

Mr. FASCELL. I think there is a distinction in mind there.

Are there any rockets on the island of Turiguano and on—

Major CASSELL. No, sir; not of which we have knowledge.

Mr. MONAGAN. I gather from what you have said that there is no evidence of any permanent Soviet naval squadron being stationed at Cuba.

Major CASSELL. No, sir.

Mr. MONAGAN. Has there been a tripling of missile boats from a year ago?

Major CASSELL. No, sir.

Mr. MONAGAN. Is there any increase in those?

Major CASSELL. No, sir; that number has remained at [security deletion].

Mr. MONAGAN. I have just recently come back from a trip that included a visit to Iceland and we had a naval briefing there. Then I was in Europe and had occasion to go into the Middle Eastern prob-



lem. This activity that we see here is only a portion of the worldwide increase in naval activity on the part of the Soviets. The more I see of it, the harder it is for me to relate it to any particular objective. If we take the Caribbean, we can relate it to an objective. If we take the activity in the North Atlantic, we can relate it to something else. That in the Mediterranean can be related to another objective.

What is the analysis of this overall Soviet increase in naval activity?

General PHILPOTT. The general analysis on the Soviet strategy for use of naval ships, as we indicated in the briefing, is to develop those ships which will permit them to operate in all of the oceans of the world.

As you describe the reasons for operating in the different areas are different, such as the Mediterranean area, the Iceland area, large naval exercises in the Pacific area, but the pattern is quite clear and it appears that he intends to build, as I indicated, ships that can operate in all the oceans of the world.

Mr. MONAGAN. But it is not related to any one particular objective geographically speaking?

General PHILPOTT. No, sir.

Mr. MONAGAN. And it is a tremendous allocation of resources. Thinking back on our own experience. Of course, after the war we had an increase in defense activities, but it was in response to a specific threat that was started and it is hard for me to see the same threat in the direction of the Soviets.

General PHILPOTT. The emerging pattern is that the U.S.S.R. intends to have those weapons systems: Navy, Air Force, and Army, which would permit them not to be second in any area in comparison with the United States.

Mr. MONAGAN. I have seen statements that there was to be a conference on naval etiquette in the Mediterranean. Has that taken place yet, do you know? Has there been any progress in that direction?

Commander HEKIN. I thought those conferences would begin on October 12. That is the last date I have.

Mr. MONAGAN. Mr. Gross, have you any questions?

Mr. GROSS. I have no questions. I waited for an hour for a quorum on another subcommittee and could not be here.

Mr. FASCELL. General, I want to thank you and all the rest of you for bearing with us while we have run back and forth between committee meetings. We appreciate that.

I want to ask a few more questions and then give the others who have just joined us an opportunity to inquire.

What is our intelligence and our evaluation of Castro's manipulation of the freedom flights which have recently been temporarily reinstated?

Major CASSELL. Frankly, sir, we have seen very little comment on this except in the open Cuban press.

[Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. What is our evaluation about what is going on? Obviously this is all a political gambit of some kind.

General PHILPOTT. [Security deletion.] I imagine we could get a better answer from the State Department on it. Have you tried it?

Mr. FASCELL. I wouldn't be asking you if I thought I could get a better answer some place else.

Mr. TILTON. May I contribute something to that?

Mr. FASCELL. Please do. I understand it is not military and I won't hold you to your assessment or your testimony.

Colonel FREED. Sir, may we go off the record on this?

Mr. FASCELL. Surely. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. FASCELL. As far as Soviet activity in the Caribbean for the seventies, can we expect a continuation of Soviet efforts to make their military and political presence felt in the Caribbean?

General PHILPOTT. Yes, for the decade of the seventies.

Mr. FASCELL. Obviously we have already postulated every conceivable action which they might take next. The Russians treat this like a game of chess. But whatever their next step is, we obviously have a plan of action to meet it, both politically and militarily.

Has our Government drawn a line yet beyond which we will not let them go?

General PHILPOTT. I don't know, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. That is a policy decision and it doesn't go down the line. You just feed the stuff up the line.

General PHILPOTT. We provide the intelligence and the decisions are made by other people.

Mr. FASCELL. How do you know where to concentrate your intelligence efforts at a given moment if you don't know what the policy is? You can't cover everything and be effective.

General PHILPOTT. We provide the intelligence to the Secretary of Defense, to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They meet with the National Security Council and the decisions, which would require the drawing of a line, as you propose, would be discussed in that particular meeting. All of the intelligence pertinent to the U.S.S.R. and Cuba—

Mr. FASCELL. Would then be developed immediately or made available?

General PHILPOTT. It is developed now. It is published and every time we get additional information it is properly evaluated and disseminated to all people in DOD.

Mr. FASCELL. Intelligence says that the barges are still there, and all the facilities for rest and recreation of the crew. It is obvious that any time the Russians want to take the next bite all they have to do is to just move in a tender. If they then want to go even further they move in a nuclear-powered missile-carrying submarine. Then we have to say something.

We have already had a high ranking official of this administration testify that the original understanding, announced by President Kennedy on November 20, 1962, that the Soviet Union had agreed not to install any offensive-weapons systems (nuclear weapons) in Cuba nor operate such systems from the Western Hemisphere had been extended by the Soviet Union in October 1970 to preclude a military naval base in Cuba.

If that is our posture, we have to have immediate intelligence to tell us the understanding has been violated. Are we looking for the tender? The barges are already there.

General PHILPOTT. We are looking for the tender. We have been also watching for every type submarine that operates in the waters, of



all classes. If a situation occurred which was serious to the national policy of this country, I feel we would have a good chance of getting the intelligence and making it available.

Mr. FASCELL. You do get specific instructions, do you not?

General PHILPOTT. We have instructions from Secretary Laird and Admiral Moorer to keep them briefed on the location of all types of Soviet ships in Caribbean waters and in the Gulf of Mexico.

Mr. FASCELL. You are saying you operate within the general charter of your intelligence requirements and that you don't get specifics from time to time?

General PHILPOTT. Yes, sir, we have a meeting with Admiral Moorer every morning.

Mr. FASCELL. You do get specifics then?

General PHILPOTT. Yes, sir; and he advises us of his requirements. The system really is very good. It is sound.

Mr. FASCELL. Who in DOD is responsible for the application of acquired intelligence to the present policy? Is the Defense Intelligence Agency's responsibility solely to place the information in channels to the Secretary of Defense? Is the same information also simultaneously made available to the Joint Chiefs of Staff? Is that right?

General PHILPOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. We have a public policy statement of the United States. You get the intelligence which triggers this policy statement. You send it up the line. It goes to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense and then you are through with it. Is that right?

General PHILPOTT. We are through with it as far as providing that intelligence. However, if there are going to be contingency plans or JCS actions, or OSD actions, our intelligence personnel will be working with other people in OSD.

Mr. FASCELL. On a semioperational basis?

General PHILPOTT. Yes; I can take your question to the Director of the Joint Staff.

Mr. FASCELL. That is not necessary. I am just trying to see how we get into and out of these things.

Mr. KAZEN. Mr. Chairman, could I ask you a question?

Mr. FASCELL. Go ahead.

Mr. KAZEN. Was this question about the agreement a hypothetical question on your part or was there such a thing?

Mr. FASCELL. [Security deletion.]

General PHILPOTT. Would you like to have an example off the record of how intelligence flows within the Defense Department.

Mr. FASCELL. Off the record, please.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. FASCELL. What other kind of naval support activities are in and around Cuba?

Major CASSELL. There has been no change in any of these other facilities. Casilda, for instance, has only a little POL handling area and a sugar-loading pier.

Antilla is a small port, loading general cargo.

Mariel is a larger port once again not related with combatants necessarily. We have seen no change in the facilities of any of those ports. That is, no new construction.

Mr. FASCELL. Do I understand that DIA attaches no particular military significance to the [security deletion] advisers who have come into Cuba as a result of joint agreement?

Major CASSELL. No, sir; no military.

Mr. FASCELL. In other words, as far as we know there is an honest-to-goodness joint exchange on science, culture, and so forth.

General PHILPOTT. At this time it appears to be that.

Mr. FASCELL. Are there any indications of Soviet naval activities or facilities elsewhere in the Caribbean or Latin America?

Major CASSELL. No.

Mr. FASCELL. None whatever?

Miss PEED. We have a recently announced agreement of the Soviets to assist Peru and Chile in building fishing ports which, of course, could be converted for naval support, but at the present time we have no indication of any military agreements, missiles or naval activities any place else.

Mr. FASCELL. I raised that question because this subcommittee also has hearings on the Panama Canal issue.

Mr. FULTON. At what stage are those proposals in Peru and Chile?

Miss PEED. No work has been done. It has been a press announcement that an agreement was made. We have no details at this point. We do not even know for certain where the fishing port will be built in Chile. It will be built in Peru at a point near the Ecuadoran border, but we have no details.

Mr. FASCELL. Am I correct in assuming that the pattern of Soviet naval activity in the Caribbean is being slowly upgraded and that we can expect that it will continue?

General PHILPOTT. We can expect it to go on. In 1969 there was one visit. In 1970 there were three and have been two visits so far this year. The pattern seems to be increasing. Just how much it is going to increase in future years, I don't know. I would expect him to hold the level he has and increase slightly if he thinks he can get away with it.

Mr. FASCELL. A servicing facility is for either nuclear or conventional subs. It would be basically the same. The thing that makes the difference is the kind of tender, is that correct?

Commander HEekin. Yes, sir. That and other support ships and craft that may be available.

Mr. FASCELL. General, how does the establishment, if you will forgive the word, evaluate the kind of intelligence furnished by the Cuban underground and other sources which are constantly published all over?

General PHILPOTT. I don't know about the establishment.

Mr. FASCELL. How do you and your staff view it?

General PHILPOTT. I will get an expression from members of my staff, but my view is that there is so much that it is difficult for us to run it all down. In some cases where I have read intelligence reports and run them down there is really a thread of truth that exists in some of them. You can see very well how some of our information such as [security deletion] photography helps us to evaluate the information.

There is sometimes a tendency for the untrained observer to go too far in drawing conclusions.



Mr. TILTON. I certainly concur with what the General has said, sir. I would say with regard to the intelligence information that comes to our office at the Cuba desk, that a great deal of the so-called refugee information has to be looked at very warily.

[Security deletion.]

(A classified document entitled "Evaluation of Cuban Refugee Reporting" was furnished and is retained in the subcommittee files.)

[Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. Lady and gentlemen, thank you very much. We appreciate your coming before the subcommittee and giving us this update on a vital area.

We thank you for your patience and courtesy.

(Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.)