

C.-IN-C. STAFF MINUTE SHEET

PLEASE RETURN TO C-IN-C SECRETARY'S OFFICE

CIR'N FILE NO.

C.- 02399.

SUBJECT:

R B/2: collision - Wallenburg
+ "Trois Rivieres"

DATE: 11-9.

TO

INITIALS
& DATE

STAFF OFFICERS' REMARKS

Report R/B
11/9

~~cos(6)~~
AM
12/9

✓

C-in-C

Sec'y

2/10/9

PL

(NAVAL SERVICE)

REFERENCE: The Commander-in-Chief, Canadian Northwest
Atlantic's letter of 25th August, 1944
File: CNA 55-2-1/433.

SUBJECT : BOARD OF ENQUIRY, COLLISION-HMCS "WALLACEBURG"
AND HMCS "TROIS RIVIERES".

MINUTE II


File: D. O.- 45490
D. 25-20-3
D. 22-8-3

The Commander-in-Chief,
Canadian Northwest Atlantic,
Area Combined Headquarters.

Submitted.

2.
informed.

This Officer has been so



6th September, 1944.
/

W. L. Puxley
(W.L. Puxley)
ACTING CAPTAIN, R.N.
CAPTAIN (D) HALIFAX.

(NAVAL SERVICE)

FROM...THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, CANADIAN NORTHWEST ATLANTIC,
AREA COMBINED HEADQUARTERS, HALIFAX, N.S.

DATE...25TH AUGUST, 1944.

FILE..C.N.A. 55-2-1/433

TO.....CAPTAIN (D) HALIFAX, H.M.C. DOCKYARD, HALIFAX, N.S.

BOARD OF ENQUIRY
COLLISION - "WALLACEBURG" AND "TROIS RIVIERES"

With reference to D-25-20-3, 22-8-3 of 12th July 1943, as a result of the collision between H.M.C.S "WALLACEBURG" and H.M.C.S. "TROIS RIVIERES" on the 20th June 1944, Lieutenant-Commander Robert Auburn Steward MacNeil, O.B.E., R.C.N.R. (Temp) "Wallaceburg" is to be informed that he has incurred the severe displeasure of the Department for his error in judgement on this occasion.

2. Copy of C.N.A. 55-2-1/433 of 16th July is attached.

Cos(0) DM 26/8

I will accept the reproach of the Department in this matter.

W. MURRAY
(L.W. MURRAY)
REAR ADMIRAL, R.C.N.



I still feel that a ship with modern instruments should be able to get out of this harbour in any fog, and this sweep was required for the safety of some 7000 good Canadian soldiers.

Omms 26/8

H. K. [unclear]

Rechecked HCR 31/8/44.

[Signature] 25/8

C.-IN-C. STAFF MINUTE SHEET

PLEASE RETURN TO C-IN-C SECRETARY'S OFFICE

CIR'N FILE NO.
C.-

SUBJECT:

DATE:

TO

INITIALS
& DATE

STAFF OFFICERS' REMARKS

Response
DHP
WRT D-25-20-5, 22-8-3 of 12th
July 1943, as a result of the collision between HMCS
Wallacburg and HMCS Zion Rivers on 20th June 1944, ~~at~~
" "
2. Copy of CNA 51-2-1/433 of 16th July is
attached. *25/8*

C-in-C
H. Krug
Sec'y

25/8

C-in-C. STAFF MINUTE SHEET

PLEASE RETURN TO C-IN-C SECRETARY'S OFFICE

CIR'N FILE NO.

C. 01836

SUBJECT:

Decision of NSHQ on B. 6/2.
"Wallaceburg", "Trans Riveres"

DATE: 22-8

TO	INITIALS & DATE	STAFF OFFICER'S REMARKS
S.O.	<p>Ans yes 23/8</p>	<p>Propose ^{II} Capt. D. Forwarded for information and necessary action. Copy of CNA 55-2-1/433 of 16 July 1944 is enclosed. (Remarks ?) 21/8 K.M.G.</p>
C.O.S. (6)	<p>Ally 24/8</p>	<p>Lt. bdr. Mac Neil still C.O. of K.M.L "Wallaceburg" under Capt. D. Actually SOE is for it - WRT Para 2. He originated the signal and was Duty Commander the night in question. He knew of the thick weather conditions and after due consideration decided not to amend or cancel the orders. Had Wallaceburg objected they would have been cancelled. Maybe CNA 55-2-1/433 16 July 1944 Colored the urgency of the operation a bit on the high side, which accounted for HQ attitude under Para 2</p>

C-in-C
Sec'y

PTO

SMITH was SOE in June.

NSHQ's point in this case is, I think, that insufficient leeway was given for ships sailing at 0600z to complete their job by 1400z at Halifax. L.V. - they have a habit now of issuing general edicts on things which should be restricted to specific instances.

ALL



Department of National Defence
Naval Service

Ottawa, Canada. 10th August, 1944.

OUR FILE N.S.C.11151-374/8 Vol. 1 (Staff)
CONFIDENTIAL
YOUR FILE C.N.A. 55-2-1/433

MEMORANDUM:

With reference to your submission C.N.A. 55-2-1/433 of 16th July, 1944, enclosing minutes of proceedings of Board of Enquiry on the collision between H.M.C.S. "WALLACEBURG" and H.M.C.S. "TROIS RIVIERES" on 20th June, 1944, it is desired that Lieutenant-Commander Robert Auburn Stewart MacNeil, O.B.E., R.C.N.R. (Temp.), be advised that he has incurred the severe displeasure of the Department for his error in judgment on this occasion. "

2. It is considered that the operational authority responsible for sailing H.M.C.S. "WALLACEBURG" did not give sufficient thought to the hazards that would be encountered should the Commanding Officer obey his sailing orders literally. The officer concerned is to be admonished and in future operational authorities are to ensure that Commanding Officers are allowed discretion in cases where implicit obedience of sailing orders will necessitate their taking unessential risks.



The Commander-in-Chief,
Canadian Northwest Atlantic,
Area Combined Headquarters,
Halifax, N. S.

BY ORDER,
L. F. Morgan
Deputy SECRETARY, NAVAL BOARD.

TOP SECRET
NAVAL MESSAGE

IMPORTANT HAND MESSAGE

TO: WALLACEBURG LACHINE WESTMOUNT
-R- NCSO D HFX

FROM: C IN C CNA

WALLACEBURG TAKE SHIPS ADDRESSED UNDER ORDERS AND AT
0600Z-26 PROCEED TO SEA VIA OJA 258. FROM HALIFAX
NO. 6 LIGHT VESSEL CARRY OUT AN ORGANIZED A/S SWEEP
087° TO A DEPTH OF 36 MILES. SPEED 12 KNOTS. SWEEP
THE RECIPROCAL COURSE WITH SPEED ADJUSTED TO ARRIVE
HALIFAX LIGHT VESSEL AT 1400Z/26 KEEPING WELL CLEAR
OF AT 127 (NIEUW AMSTERDAM) OUTBOUND THROUGH AREA
SWEPT

2. MAINTAIN W/T WATCHES AS IN ACCO 32

3. RHOC

251507Z

37

SHM TO WALLACEBURG LACHINE WESTMOUNT

251510Z/6/44

MC/LG/

OPS EOG
DUFFY SO
DUTY CONT
SOE
~~SOE~~
SOC
NCSO
MCO 2
CAPT D
SOO

CONFIDENTIAL

PLEASE RETURN TO C-IN-C SECRETARY'S OFFICE

CIR'N FILE NO.

C. 0707.

SUBJECT:

B/2: collision of "Wallenburg"
"Trois Rivières"

DATE:

18.7

TO

INITIALS
& DATE

STAFF OFFICER'S REMARKS

C.I.C

E 17/5

Capt. [unclear] recommended trial by Court Martial
of C.O. Wallenburg.
Request remains please reference trial
by C.M. before SCOD. 1/13/7

copy

~~C-50~~

AM
20/7

CWA 55-2-1/433
1/16 July has been
dispatched.

P.A.

C-in-C
Sec'y

1/20/7

(NAVAL SERVICE)

FROM: Captain (D) Halifax.

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE: 12th July 1944.

FILE: D. 25-20-3
D. 22-8-3

TO: The Commander-in-Chief,
Canadian Northwest Atlantic,
Area Combined Headquarters.

BOARD OF ENQUIRY
COLLISION - H.M.C.S. "WALLACEBURG" AND "TROIS RIVIERES"

The enclosed Minutes and Findings of a Board of Enquiry held on 30th June 1944, to investigate the circumstances attending a collision involving H.M.C.S. "WALLACEBURG" and "TROIS RIVIERES" on the 26th June 1944, are submitted for information and consideration.

2. The Findings of the Board are concurred in and it is considered that the Commanding Officer of H.M.C.S. "WALLACEBURG" is solely to blame for the collision which occurred. It is further considered that the Commanding Officer of H.M.C.S. "TROIS RIVIERES" took all reasonable precautions for the safety of his ship.

3. The Commanding Officer of H.M.C.S. "WALLACEBURG" has shown good service in the past, in command of Corvettes and an ex-American Destroyer, and as Senior Officer of a Western Escort Group, and his knowledge of escort work in general is above average. Further, his opinions and his efforts to improve the efficiency of his Group and the Escort Force generally have been highly regarded. He also performed excellent service as Senior Sea Training Officer on the staff of Captain (D) Halifax from 20th February 1943 to 24th November 1943.

4. It is, therefore, with regret that I have to recommend that this officer be tried by Court Martial for negligently or by default hazarding his ship and the Escort Group of which he was Senior Officer, in proceeding with his Group at excessive speed in dense fog in narrow and congested waters. It is observed that this is the second occasion on which Lieut.-Cdr. R.A.S. MacNEIL, R.C.N.R., has hazarded his ship in fog.



W. L. PUXLEY

(W. L. Puxley)
ACTING CAPTAIN, R.N.
CAPTAIN (D) HALIFAX.

Encls.
P/R

II...P.T.O.

II.

File....C.N.A. 55-2-1/433

The Secretary, Naval Board,
Department of National Defence,
OTTAWA.

Submitted for the consideration of the Department concurring in the finding of the Board of Inquiry.

Undoubtedly the collision was caused by excessive speed on the part of H.M.C.S. WALLACEBURG, but it is submitted that this group of ships was engaged in an urgent operation of war, namely the protection of a "Monster", and that a U-boat was believed to be in the vicinity at the time.

2. The group had been delayed by fog and, in an hour and fifty-one minutes, had only progressed about five and a half miles. The anxiety of the Senior Officer to press on because of the urgency of his mission can be realized.

3. His decision to proceed at 10 knots from the vicinity of Mars Rock Buoy, trusting to Radar to keep him clear of further shipping he might meet, was more an error in judgment, however, than negligence, and, unless the Department directs otherwise, it is not intended to bring the case before a Court-Martial.

4. It is observed that this is the second case against this officer in recent months, but the first one has been dealt with by Court-Martial and punishment awarded.

5. It is interesting to note that the memory of the previous occasion was not allowed to bear too heavily upon his judgment when called upon to make decisions under difficult conditions.

6. Under these conditions, and observing the urgency of the operation upon which he was employed, it is submitted that the error of judgment should be accepted, and that he should be warned to be more careful in future, or, at the most, he should receive an expression of the Department's displeasure.

The Commander-in-Chief,
Canadian Northwest Atlantic,
16th July, 1944.



L. W. MURRAY

(L. W. Murray)
REAR ADMIRAL, R.C.N.

55 2-1/433

S. 1320 D
FORM 11-43 (2667-8-9-70)
GPO: 1945 O-815-9-1320-D.
K. P. 95440

WALLACEBURG, THREE RIVERS (R) STE THERESE,
EASTVIEW, STADACOA, SCOTIAN

NAVAL MESSAGE

To:

1 3 4 9 15 14-2

From:

SEC A BOARD OF INQUIRY WILL BE CONVENED IN ROOM 311 OF DOCKYARD
 BUILDING D 14 AT 0930P ON FRIDAY THE 30TH JUNE 1944 TO
 CIRCUMSTANCES
 INVESTIGATE THE ATTENDING THE COLLISION INVOLVING
 EMCS WALLACEBURG AND EMCS THREE RIVERS AT APPROXIMATELY 0453P
 MONDAY 26TH JUNE 1944. THE BOARD WILL BE COMPRISED OF THE
 FOLLOWING OFFICERS:-
 CDR. G P B ASHE, RCN, EMCS STADACOA, PRESIDENT.
 LT-CDR J E MITCHELL, RCNVR, EMCS STE. THERESE,
 LIEUT. A M KIRKPATRICK, RCNVR, EMCS EASTVIEW.
 LIEUT J NOIAN, RCNR, EMCS STADACOA, MEMBERS:
 A SHORTHAND WRITER HAS BEEN DETAILED BY EMCS STADACOA. THE
 CO 'S OF EMCS WALLACEBURG AND EMCS THREE RIVERS ARE REQUIRED TO
 ENSURE THE PRESENCE OF ALL NECESSARY WITNESSES?.

PASSED SHIPS BY D SIGS

292015

HAND P/L 292140Z-6-44 MC/RRM

*B.H. - 10/7 JW
hasland*

B.H. 21/7 JW

REPORT OF COLLISION OR GROUNDING*(King's Regulations and Admiralty Instructions, Articles 1167 and 1170.)*

H.M.C.S. "TROIS RIVIERES"

Date 26th June 1944.

ATTENTION IS CALLED TO THE NECESSITY FOR MAKING A FIRST REPORT BY TELEGRAM OF COLLISIONS OR SERIOUS GROUNDINGS.

If it is desirable to answer any question at greater length than the space provided in the form permits, the answer (numbered) should be written on a separate sheet and attached hereto.

If all the particulars required hereunder cannot be furnished promptly, the report should not be delayed, any information that has been omitted being sent in as soon as possible afterwards.

*(Any question not applicable to the report should be crossed out.)***SECTION I (Collision or Grounding)**

1. Date, time, and place/position of collision/grounding.

(Strike out words inapplicable.)

June 26 1944, 0453½ (zone plus 3)

Lat. ° ' Long. ° ' , or bearing

and distance approx. 335°-3 cables from
("Neverfail" buoy.)

SSE - 1

2. Direction and force of the wind

Tide ebbing

3. Direction and rate of tidal stream or current

Thick fog, calm sea, average swell

4. State of weather and sea

1/2 cable

5. Estimated visibility

Under way

6. Was H.M.C. Ship at anchor or under way?

Bow crumpled on starboard side back

7. What damage is H.M.C. Ship estimated to have received?

to frame 3.

8. Were salvage services rendered as a result of the collision or grounding? If so, name and address of Officer in charge of salvage operations should be stated.

No.

SECTION II—COLLISION (with another vessel, or, with a wharf, dock, jetty, or the like)

The report should be accompanied whenever possible by a plan or tracing from the chart (see page 3) to illustrate the courses and direction of advance, the movements of own ship (and where the collision has been with another vessel, of her also), and any other information likely to be of value in enabling a decision as to liability to be reached.

8A. State name of other vessel, approximate tonnage, and ownership and Port of Registry if known. (In collision with jetty, etc., state authorities in control of, or responsible for jetty.)

H.M.C.S. "WALLACEBURG"

9. Course and speed (if under way) of H.M.C. Ship when the other ship was first sighted, or, in the case of a jetty, etc., when course was shaped to approach it.

345° - 7 knots

10. Any subsequent alterations of course and speed by H.M.C. Ship.

Engines stopped, Half astern,

full astern.

11. *Was the other vessel at anchor or under way?

Under way

12. *Estimated course and speed of other vessel (if under way) when first sighted.

Approx. reciprocal course, 10 knots.

Speed reduced before impact.

13. *Any subsequent alterations of course and/or speed by other vessel.

light.

14. *(a) *What navigation lights, if any, were exhibited by H.M.C. Ship?

Masthead lights, side lights, stern

(b) *When were these first exhibited?

First exhibited when a beam Hfx. #6, I.V.

15. The time when the other vessel was first seen, or, in the case of a jetty, etc., when course was shaped to approach it.

0452½ light observed - 0453 ship sight

16. The bearing and distance of the other vessel when first seen, or, in the case of a jetty, etc., when course was shaped to approach it.

345°, ½ cable (lights visible at

longer range)


(NOTE.—Questions marked * are not applicable in collision with jetty, etc.)

SECTION III—GROUNDING (Contd.)

32. (a) With what sounding equipment was the vessel provided?
- (b) What use was made of soundings, including hand lead, to check the ship's position prior to the grounding? Give details.
33. The ship's draught (a) forward (b) aft..... (a).....ft.....ins. (b).....ft.....ins.
34. The least depth of water under (a) the bows, (b) amidships, and (c) the stern, during the time she remained on shore. (a).....ft.....ins. (b).....ft.....ins. (c).....ft.....ins.
35. Date, time, and position of last fix obtained prior to grounding and object(s) used to obtain it.
36. Number and date of chart in use, and particulars of last large or small corrections.

The statement of grounding is to be accompanied by a track chart, commencing from the date when the ship last left port, and, if possible, by a clear and comprehensive plan of the place where the incident occurred, and in any case angles between as many of such prominent objects as may be in sight as will suffice to fix accurately the position when aground. When possible at least five such angles should be forwarded. Bearings taken from the standard compass of the same objects should be also given, stating the deviation of the compass.

Diagram illustrating relative positions, and movements, of vessels prior to collision, to be completed, if possible, in all cases of collision. The diagram may also be used for the plan of the place where the ship grounded, but not for the track chart.



SECTION IV—REPAIRS (after Collision or Grounding)

- 37. Is H.M.C. Ship seaworthy?.....
- 38. If not, have arrangements been made to repair her? (Give details.)
- 39. What is estimated cost of making good the damage to H.M.C. Ship?
- 40. What time is required for repairs?.....
- 41. Has the damage been surveyed?.....
(If so, survey report to be attached.)

No.

Yes?

See Hull Surveyor's Report 27/6/44.

" " " " " "

Yes

37 to 41 - see Hull Surveyor's report re "WALLACEBURG" 27/6/44.

In the case of collision with another vessel, state here if possible the answers to questions similar to 37 and 41 above, in respect of *the other vessel*, and, in the case of collision with jetty, etc., the answer to question similar to 41 respecting it.

SECTION V—GENERAL (Collision or Grounding)

Copies of the Deck Log, and the Rough and Fair Engine Room Registers, accompany this statement.
All relative data have been inserted on this form, and are correct to the best of our belief.

Signature of Navigating Officer (grounding) *J.M. Ferguson*
Officer of Watch (collision)

Rank *P/Lt* Date *June 27 1944*

Signature of Commanding Officer *W. W. Murray*

Rank *LTJG* Date *June 27 1944*

SECTION VI—REMARKS BY ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY

- 42. Is blame considered attributable to anyone? If so, to whom, and to what extent? In collision cases, the extent, if any, to which it is considered blame attaches to the other vessel (or, in the case of collision with jetty, etc., to the shore authorities or berthing party) should be stated.
- 43. Has a Board of Inquiry been held? If not, is one proposed?
- 44. What disciplinary action, if any, has been taken? If not, what disciplinary action, if any, is proposed?
- 45. In the case of collision with another vessel, has any claim been received from the other vessel? In the case of collision with jetty, etc., has any claim been received from the authorities concerned? If so, details should be attached.
- 46. Has this claim been met? If so, state
(a) the amount of payment and name of payee.
(b) the reference to the cash account in which the payment will be recorded.

To be decided by Board of Enquiry.

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

Propose Board of Enquiry.

None at present.

.....

No.

.....

.....

C-in-C. *C.N.A.* **Submitted**
~~Forwarded~~

(W. L. Puxley) Administrative Authority.
ACTING CAPTAIN, R.N. Rank.
CAPTAIN (D) HALIFAX
12th July, 1944. Date.

Remarks by Commander-in-Chief.

Remarks attached

Naval Service Headquarters—Forwarded.

L. W. MURRAY Commander-in-Chief.
C.N.A. Command.
17.7.44 Date.


From: Commanding Officer,
HMCS Trois Rivieres,

To: Captain "D",
Halifax N.S.

COLLISION HMCS TROIS RIVIERES & HMCS WALLACEBURG

I have to report that this vessel was in collision with HMCS Wallaceburg at about 0453 $\frac{1}{2}$ ADT Monday June 26th. Approximate position 335 (T) three cables from Neverfail buoy. Visibility f-1, wind SSE-1, sea 01. Tide ebbing.

- 2 HMCS Trois Rivieres was escorting convoy JH-109, consisting of one ship, S.S. Imperoil (S.S. Rocha having straggled).
- 3 The inner automatic was reached at approximately 0329, and the pilot was contacted and directed to the S.S. Imperoil. Visibility being extremely poor, due to dense fog and as it was still dark, the ship remained in sight of the inner automatic until 0432, at which time it was fairly light, but fog conditions remained unchanged. At 0432 course of 333 was shaped for Neverfail, both engines at slow ahead, giving the ship's minimum speed of 7 knots. Engines were stopped at Neverfail, there being several merchant ships anchored in the vicinity. At 0447, some two minutes after arriving at the buoy, engines were started again for a period of $\frac{1}{2}$ minute, then stopped and finally restarted at 0450, and a course of 345 (T) shaped for the gate.
- 4 At 0452 $\frac{1}{2}$ a light was reported ahead from an officer on the forecastle. Both engines were stopped, then rung half astern and three short blasts sounded on the air horn. At 0453 a vessel was reported in sight dead ahead. Both engines were rung to full astern and three short blasts were again sounded. 0453 $\frac{1}{2}$ Wallaceburg emerged from the fog, and collision was made bow to bow. The ships drew rapidly apart after the collision and both engines were stopped.
- 5 While proceeding from inner automatic, one blast of from 4-6 seconds duration was sounded on the air horn while under way, and two when the engines were stopped. Shortly before sighting Wallaceburg two Z's had been blown, to attract the attention of the Examination Vessel. Due to the noise of the diesel engines, sounds from other vessels or buoys are extremely hard to hear, and the only sound signal that the C.O. heard from Wallaceburg after sighting, was one short blast shortly before the two vessels were in collision.
- 6 At the time of collision, besides the Commanding Officer, the following officers were on the bridge; Lieutenant Ferguson, Officer of the Watch, from whom the C.O. had taken over, and Lieutenant Dawson, Navigating officer. Special sea dutymen were closed up, and the Engineer Officer was in the Engine room. Lieutenant Woodcroft and one rating were forward in the eyes of the ship



W.G. Garden,

Lieutenant R.C.N.V.R.

(COPY)

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE
(Naval Service)

FROM :

TO :

MANAGER CONSTRUCTIVE DEPARTMENT,
H.M.C. DOCKYARD,
HALIFAX, N.S.

THE COMMODORE SUPERINTENDENT,
H.M.C. DOCKYARD,
HALIFAX, N.S.

June 26th, 1944.

H.M.C.S. "THREE RIVERS"

REPORT OF SURVEY (COLLISION DAMAGE)

Reference to signal from Captain (D) Halifax, N.S.
to "C" Supt. dated 261310Z/6/44.

Item No. 1 Frames, deck beams and brackets. Forecastle deck.
(Standard side).

(a) #0 frame, deckbeam, and deckbeam bracket badly
distorted on starboard side. To be removed and
renewed.

(b) #1 frame, (short section above hawse pipe flange)
badly distorted on starboard side. To be removed
and renewed.

(c) #1 deckbeam, badly distorted on starboard side.
To be cropped at centre line and renewed on starboard
side.

(d) #1 deckbeam bracket badly distorted on starboard
side. To be removed and renewed.

(e) #2 frame, badly distorted at head on starboard side.
To be cropped for approximately 3' down. Top section
to be renewed.

(f) #2 deckbeam badly distorted on starboard side,
to be cropped for approximately 3' inboard and renewed.

(g) #2 deckbeam bracket, badly distorted on starboard
side. To be removed and renewed.

(h) #2 frame, distorted at deck of fore peak compart-
ment on starboard side to be faired in place.

Item No. 2. Shell, deck and stem plates.

(a) #7 shell plate on "G" strake, starboard side badly
fractured and distorted. To be removed and renewed.

(b) #1 centre line deck plate badly fractured and distorted.
To be removed and renewed.

(c) Deck stringer plate, badly fractured and distorted
on starboard side. To be cropped, renewed and fitted with
butt strap between station #3 and 4.

(d) Starboard, forward corner of #2 centre line plate,
fractured and distorted. To be cropped and renewed for
approximately 1 sq. ft. and spigot patch fitted between
stations 1 and 2.

(e) Top edge of "F" strake indented on starboard side
between stations Nos. 1 and 3. To be faired in place.

(f) Contour plate of stem, indented at head approx.
4" to be faired in place.

Item No. 3 Miscellaneous Items.

- (a) Forecastle deck boundary angle, on starboard bow badly fractured and distorted. To be cropped from stem to station #3 renewed and fitted with bosom bars.
- (b) Top of hawse pipe flange slightly distorted on starboard side, to be faired in place.
- (c) Air vent and sound pipe to fore peak compartment carried away at forecastle deck on starboard side between stations "2 and 3. Top section to be welded in place.
- (d) Jack Staff and 2 in No. guard rails stanchions distorted on starboard side. To be removed, faired and replaced.
- (e) Blake slip distorted, starboard. To be faired in place.
- (f) Chain for Collision mat fractured. To have 1 in No. new links fitted.
- (g) Fairlead stool on starboard side badly distorted to be renewed.
- (h) 2 in No. fairleads, 1 port and 1 starboard to be removed to facilitate repairs to deck.
- (i) Guide on windlass for anchor cable to wildcat, fractured and distorted. To be removed, faired, welded and replaced.

Ship is not seaworthy in present condition.

Estimated costs to repair	---	\$3000.00
" time " "	---	12 days.

IAD:MM

H. Streeter,
Hull Inspector & Surveyor.
for MANAGER CONSTRUCTIVE DEPT.

REPORT OF COLLISION OR GROUNDING

(King's Regulations and Admiralty Instructions, Articles 1167 and 1170.)

H.M.C.S. "WALLACEBURG"

Date 26th June, 1944

ATTENTION IS CALLED TO THE NECESSITY FOR MAKING A FIRST REPORT BY TELEGRAM OF COLLISIONS OR SERIOUS GROUNDINGS.

If it is desirable to answer any question at greater length than the space provided in the form permits, the answer (numbered) should be written on a separate sheet and attached hereto.

If all the particulars required hereunder cannot be furnished promptly, the report should not be delayed, any information that has been omitted being sent in as soon as possible afterwards.

(Any question not applicable to the report should be crossed out.)

SECTION I (Collision or Grounding)

1. Date, time, and place/position of collision/grounding.
(Strike out words inapplicable.)

0753Z 1944, 26 June (zone +3)
Lat.....°.....' Long.....°.....', or bearing
and distance 300° (T) 1 to 2 cables,

2. Direction and force of the wind.....

from Neverfail Buoy - Dan Buoy dropped

3. Direction and rate of tidal stream or current....

by H.M.C.S. "TROIS RIVIERES".

4. State of weather and sea.....

5. Estimated visibility.....

6. Was H.M.C. Ship at anchor or under way?.....

Under way.

7. What damage is H.M.C. Ship estimated to have received?

Not surveyed as yet.

8. Were salvage services rendered as a result of the collision or grounding? If so, name and address of Officer in charge of salvage operations should be stated.

- No -

SECTION II—COLLISION (with another vessel, or, with a wharf, dock, jetty, or the like)

The report should be accompanied whenever possible by a plan or tracing from the chart (see page 3) to illustrate the courses and direction of advance, the movements of own ship (and where the collision has been with another vessel, of her also), and any other information likely to be of value in enabling a decision as to liability to be reached.

8A. State name of other vessel, approximate tonnage, and ownership and Port of Registry if known. (In collision with jetty, etc., state authorities in control of, or responsible for jetty.)

H.M.C.S. "TROIS RIVIERES" - Royal Canadian Navy - based - Halifax, N.S.

9. Course and speed (if under way) of H.M.C. Ship when the other ship was first sighted, or, in the case of a jetty, etc., when course was shaped to approach it.

156° - Speed - 8-9 knots.

10. Any subsequent alterations of course and speed by H.M.C. Ship.

Altered - hard to starboard.

11. *Was the other vessel at anchor or under way?

Under way.

12. *Estimated course and speed of other vessel (if under way) when first sighted.

Approximately 336° - speed unknown.

13. *Any subsequent alterations of course and/or speed by other vessel.

14. *(a) *What navigation lights, if any, were exhibited by H.M.C. Ship?

Masthead - Port & Starboard running lights, and fog light astern - cluster.

(b) *When were these first exhibited?

About 30 seconds prior to collision.

15. The time when the other vessel was first seen, or, in the case of a jetty, etc., when course was shaped to approach it.

16. The bearing and distance of the other vessel when first seen, or, in the case of a jetty, etc., when course was shaped to approach it.

Dead ahead 156° (T) approximately 1/2 cable.

(NOTE.—Questions marked * are not applicable in collision with jetty, etc.)

SECTION II—COLLISION (Contd.)

17. *The lights, if any, of the other vessel which were first seen.

Masthead and port light.

18. *Whether any navigation lights of the other vessel, other than those first seen, came into view before the collision.

No.

19. *What sound signals (if any) were (i) sounded by H.M.C. Ship, and (ii) were observed to be sounded by the other vessel, and when?

ii) 1 long before altering course.
 ... 2 short when course altered to port. Blew
 1 short just before collision.

20. What measures were taken aboard H.M.C. Ship to avert the collision, and when?

ii) Blew 2 long prior to our alteration, then
 blew 2 short almost simultaneous to our
 alteration.

21. The parts of each vessel (or of own vessel and jetty, etc.) which first came in contact.

A/C hard to starboard. Stopped engines,
 then full astern. When hit stopped both.

"TROIS RIVIERES"'s anchor own stem.

22. Whether either ship was in tow or in charge of a pilot.

No

23. What acts of negligence (if any) are alleged to have been committed by the other vessel (or, in collision with jetty, etc., by the shore authorities or berthing party)?

None

24. Whether blame is attributable to those on board H.M.C. Ship, and, if so, to whom, and in what respect.

No

25. *If the collision occurred between sunset and sunrise, whether, by observation of witnesses, the position, brilliancy, etc., of the lights carried by each vessel complied with the Collision Regulations, and whether any of them were obscured by rigging or other obstructions in the direction from which the vessel under way approached.

H.M.C.S. "WALLACEBURG" burning auxiliary
 port and starboard lights - regular mast-
 head - no obstructions.

Sunrise 0528P.

26. *If sound signals are involved, state here the observations of witnesses as to the efficiency of the apparatus on each vessel for making the proper signals.

Sound signals observed to be efficient
 by both ships.

(NOTE.—Questions marked * are not applicable in collision with jetty, etc.)

SECTION III—GROUNDING

27. The rate at which H.M.C. Ship was going over the ground at the time she was struck.

28. Height of tide at time of grounding.....

29. The exact time she remained on shore.....

30. The nature of the bottom.....

31. The means taken to get her off. (If assistance was rendered by any other vessels, give details and the names of the vessels.)

SECTION III—GROUNDING (Contd.)

32. (a) With what sounding equipment was the vessel provided?
 (b) What use was made of soundings, including hand lead, to check the ship's position prior to the grounding? Give details.

.....

33. The ship's draught (a) forward (b) aft.....

(a).....ft.....ins. (b).....ft.....ins,

34. The least depth of water under (a) the bows, (b) amidships, and (c) the stern, during the time she remained on shore.

(a).....ft.....ins.
 (b).....ft.....ins.
 (c).....ft.....ins.

35. Date, time, and position of last fix obtained prior to grounding and object(s) used to obtain it.


.....

36. Number and date of chart in use, and particulars of last large or small corrections.

.....

The statement of grounding is to be accompanied by a track chart, commencing from the date when the ship last left port, and, if possible, by a clear and comprehensive plan of the place where the incident occurred, and in any case angles between as many of such prominent objects as may be in sight as will suffice to fix accurately the position when aground. When possible at least five such angles should be forwarded. Bearings taken from the standard compass of the same objects should be also given, stating the deviation of the compass.

Diagram illustrating relative positions, and movements, of vessels prior to collision, to be completed, if possible, in all cases of collision.
 The diagram may also be used for the plan of the place where the ship grounded, but not for the track chart.



SECTION IV—REPAIRS (after Collision or Grounding)

- 37. Is H.M.C. Ship seaworthy?.....
- 38. If not, have arrangements been made to repair her? (Give details.).....
- 39. What is estimated cost of making good the damage to H.M.C. Ship?.....
- 40. What time is required for repairs?.....
- 41. Has the damage been surveyed?.....
(If so, survey report to be attached.)

Yes.....
 Defects submitted.....
 Not known.....
 Not known.....
 Not as yet.....

In the case of collision with another vessel, state here if possible the answers to questions similar to 37 and 41 above, in respect of *the other vessel*, and, in the case of collision with jetty, etc., the answer to question similar to 41 respecting it.

SECTION V—GENERAL (Collision or Grounding)

Copies of the Deck Log, and the Rough and Fair Engine Room Registers, accompany this statement.
 All relative data have been inserted on this form, and are correct to the best of our belief.

Signature of Navigating Officer (grounding).....
 Officer of Watch (collision).....
 Rank..... Date 17 June 1944.

Signature of Commanding Officer.....
 Rank Lieut.-Cmdr., R.C.N.R., Date 26 June, 1944.

SECTION VI—REMARKS BY ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY

- 42. Is blame considered attributable to anyone? If so, to whom, and to what extent? In collision cases, the extent, if any, to which it is considered blame attaches to the other vessel (or, in the case of collision with jetty, etc., to the shore authorities or berthing party) should be stated.
- 43. Has a Board of Inquiry been held? If not, is one proposed?
- 44. What disciplinary action, if any, has been taken? If not, what disciplinary action, if any, is proposed?
- 45. In the case of collision with another vessel, has any claim been received from the other vessel? In the case of collision with jetty, etc., has any claim been received from the authorities concerned? If so, details should be attached.
- 46. Has this claim been met? If so, state
 (a) the amount of payment and name of payee.
 (b) the reference to the cash account in which the payment will be recorded.

To be decided by Board of Enquiry.....
 Propose Board of Enquiry.....
 None.....
 No.....

Submitted Forwarded
 C-in-C., C.N.A.
 (W. L. Puxley) Administrative Authority.
 ACTING CAPTAIN, R.N.
 CAPTAIN (D) HALIFAX. Rank.
 12th July 1944. Date.

Remarks by Commander-in-Chief.
 Naval Service Headquarters—Forwarded.
 L. W. MURRAY Commander-in-Chief.
 C.N.A. Command.
 17.7.44 Date.

(NAVAL SERVICE)

FROM: THE COMMANDING OFFICER, H.M.C.S. "WALLACEBURG".

DATE: 26th June, 1944.

FILE: WA 0 - 5 - 10.

TO : CAPTAIN (D) HALIFAX, HMC DOCKYARD, HALIFAX, N.S.

COLLISION WITH H.M.C.S. "TROIS RIVIERES"

SUBMITTED:-

At 0600Z/26, H.M.C.S. "WALLACEBURG" in company with H.M.C. Ships "LACHINE", and "WESTMOUNT", slipped from alongside at Halifax and proceeded in execution of C. in C., CNA's 251507Z. Weather conditions at time of slipping, dense fog, with intermittent rain showers.

2. Group passed gate outward in Order One, speed 8 knots at 0734Z. At 0742Z, having gone the correct distance passed Lighthouse Bank Buoy, course was altered to 172° by a Red turn, and speed increased to 10 knots.

3. When approaching Mars Rock Buoy, a large merchant ship was detected on the starboard bow by radar and sound signals. A series of signals were heard on being exchanged between this ship and the examination vessel, the latter indicating to the merchant ship that he was standing into danger by the International Sound Signal "U".

4. Shortly after passing Mars Rock Buoy, and when clear of the traffic referred to in the preceding paragraph, the Whistle Buoy on Lichfield Shoal was heard on the correct bearing, and a ship, indicating by 2 long blasts that he was stopped, was heard in the vicinity of Neverfail Buoy. Shortly after this the bell on Neverfail Shoal Buoy was heard on the correct bearing. A Red turn at this time was ordered to 155°, executive signal to follow. At 0751Z, course was altered to 155° and 2 short blasts sounded on the siren. At this point, the ship ahead bore by radar Red 05° 450 yards. Almost instantaneously 2 short blasts were heard indicating that the ship (which was subsequently identified as H.M.C.S. "TROIS RIVIERES") had got under way and altered course to port. Two short blasts were immediately sounded by "WALLACEBURG" and the helm order "hard aport" was passed to the wheelhouse. As the ship was swinging to port, the white masthead and red port light of H.M.C.S. "TROIS RIVIERES" was seen bearing fine on the port bow, indicating that he was passing from Starboard to Port, at a distance of somewhat less than one-half cable. The helm orders "midships" and "hard astarboard" were given, one short blast sounded on the siren, and a few seconds later engines rung to "stop". The red, green, and masthead lights of the H.M.C.S. "TROIS RIVIERES" were then observed dead ahead, and engines rung to "full astern". A second or two later, the stem of H.M.C.S. "WALLACEBURG" struck H.M.C.S. "TROIS RIVIERES" between its stem and starboard anchor. H.M.C.S. "TROIS RIVIERES" starboard anchor remained imbedded in H.M.C.S. "WALLACEBURG's" bow, and as the ships drew apart, several shackles of cable paid out through the hawsepipe of "TROIS RIVIERES". In the course of the next half hour or so, cable was slipped from H.M.C.S. "WALLACEBURG" and course shaped for the gate, in the midst of considerable inbound traffic.

5. Berthed on H.M.C.S. "TIMMINS" at jetty one in dense fog at 0955Z.

CAPTAIN (D)
HALIFAX
4/7
JUN 27 1944
25-20-3
22-8-3

R. C. N. R.

Lieutenant-Commander, R. C. N. R.

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE
(Naval Service)

COPY

FROM:
MANAGER CONSTRUCTIVE DEPARTMENT,
H. M. C. DOCKYARD,
HALIFAX, N. S.

TO:
THE COMMODORE SUPERINTENDENT,
H. M. C. DOCKYARD,
HALIFAX, N. S.

June 26th, 1944.

H.M.C.S. "WALLACEBURG" - REPORT OF SURVEY (DAMAGE)

Referenced to Signal from Captain "D", Halifax to "G"
Superintendent, Halifax, dated 261310Z June, 1944.


UNCLASSIFIED

1. Plate in "I" strake is fractured and buckled from stem to frame #2 on port side. Plate to be cropped from between frames #0 and 1 to stem and renewed. Fairing of plate in way of hawse pipe to be deferred.
2. Plate in "I" strake, on stbd. side is fractured and buckled from stem to frame #2. Plate to be cropped between frame #0 and 1 and renewed to stem. Plate to be faired forward of frame #1. Fairing of plate above hawse pipe to be deferred.
3. Plate of "H" strake on starboard side is fractured and buckled from stem to frame #1. Plate to be cropped between frames #1 and 2 and renewed.
4. Plate of "H" strake, on port side, is fractured and buckled from stem to frame #1, plate to be cropped between frames #1 and 2 and renewed.
5. Frames #1, port and starboard are badly buckled from below hawse pipe to upper deck. Frames to be removed and renewed from stem to hawse pipe.
6. Hanging frames #0 and 00, port and starboard are distorted from fore-castle deck to stem. Frames to be removed and renewed.
7. Bow plate is sheared away above main deck. Plate to be cropped, removed and renewed from 12" below fore-castle deck to main deck.
8. Lap of plates in "G" and "H" strakes, starboard side, is buckled near frame #1 along with frame #1. Plates and frame to be faired in place.
9. Forward fore-castle deck plate is buckled about 3 ft. aft of stem to stem plate to be faired in place.
10. Stringer angle on port side, from 3 ft. aft of stem to stem is badly buckled. Stringer angle to be faired in place.
11. Shank of stbd. anchor sheared off near body of anchor. Anchor to be renewed.

Estimated cost for repairs -- \$5000.00
" time for " -- 2 weeks

Ship not seaworthy in present condition.

NOTE: All work can be done while ship is afloat.


H. Streeter,
Hull Inspector & Surveyor,
(for) MANAGER CONSTRUCTIVE DEPARTMENT.

GW:MM

(Minute II - over)

4900

MINUTE II

File: D.H. 73-7-4.

Captain "D",
H.M.C. Dockyard,
Halifax, N.S.

Forwarded.



H.M.C. Dockyard,
Halifax, N.S.
June 27th, 1944.

(G.M. Hibbard)
Commodore, R.C.N.,
COMMODORE SUPERINTENDENT.

CMO'L/MD

- 0200 - Hands called.
- 0230 - Hands to stations for leaving harbour.
- 0300 - Slipped from F.C. Wharf course 170° - A/C 133° - 60 revs.
- 0320 - Starboard running light out replaced by auxiliary light.
- 0330 - Port running light out replaced by auxiliary light.
- 0355 - Abeam George Island A/C to 157°.
- 0403 - Abeam pier 3 - A/C 159°.
- 0434 - Passed out of gates increased to 10 knots.
- 0442 - A/C 172°.
- 0450 - Neverfail could be heard on Port bow. Lichfield on starboard bow 80 off. Ship ahead blew 2 long, we blew 2 short and A/C to 156° to pass between buoy and ship. Ship ahead blew 2 short - sighted - port and masthead light. A/C to hard aport - midships - hard astarboard.

At time of collision Lt-Comdr. R.A.S. MacNeil, RCNR - C.O. Lieutenant L.D.G. Main, V.R., X.O. & N.O., Lieutenant R.A. FRANCIS, V.R. A/S C.O., Lieut.(Elect) E.J. Dickson, V.R., Group Radar Officer were on the bridge.

H.M.C.S. "TROIS RIVIERES" starboard anchor embedded in fore-peak compartment approximately 0535. Anchor chain broken, flukes and crown of our starboard anchor carried away. W/T compartments inspected by E.O. and everything found correct aft of # 5 frame.

- 0615 - Passed through gate inward.
- 0655 - Berthed alongside of K.223 jetty one.

433

H.M.C. Dockyard,
Halifax, Nova Scotia,
30th June, 1944.

Sir,

I have the honour to submit herewith Minutes of proceedings of Board of Inquiry held in accordance with your memorandum of 29th June, 1944.

Also attached please find the following enclosures:

- (1) Findings of the Board.
- (2) Your memorandum of 29th June, 1944, with attachments thereto.
- (3) Excerpt from "Supplementary Rough Engine-Room Register" (S.467C) of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "WALLACEBURG".
- (4) Excerpt from Navigating Officer's Note Book (S.548A), of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "WALLACEBURG".
- (5) Excerpt from "Supplementary Rough Engine-Room Register" (S.467C) of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "TROIS RIVIERES".
- (6) Excerpt from Log Book of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "TROIS RIVIERES".
- (7) Original shorthand notes of Writer G. E. Agla.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,



PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD

Captain "D",
H.M.C. Dockyard,
Halifax, Nova Scotia.

Findings of the Board of Inquiry to investigate the
circumstances of the collision between H.M.C.S.
Wallaceburg and H.M.C.S. Trois Rivieres on 26th June, 1944.

A Board of Inquiry assembled at 0930 on Friday 30th June, 1944, in Room 311, Dockyard Building D-14; H.M.C. Dockyard, Halifax, to investigate the circumstances attending the collision between H.M.C.S. Wallaceburg and H.M.C.S. "Trois Rivieres" at approximately 0454 A.D.T. on Monday 26th June.

2. Nautical Twilight commenced at 0402 A.D.T. on 26th June, sunrise being at 0530. The evidence disclosed that there was a light southerly wind at the time of the collision, with dense fog, the visibility being estimated at from half a cable to one cable.

3. The findings of the Board are as follows:

(a) Both vessels were aware of the fact that there were other vessels under way and anchored in the vicinity.


(b) The collision was due to H.M.C.S. Wallaceburg proceeding at a speed which is considered to have been excessive under the conditions prevailing.

(c) The Commanding Officer, H.M.C.S. Wallaceburg, stated that he had been delayed by poor visibility, and considered his speed justified by the urgency of his assignment, as per most secret signal from the Commander in Chief, Canadian Northwest Atlantic, time of origin 261507.


(d) It is considered that the reason H.M.C.S. TROIS RIVIERES did not hear the earlier sound signals made by WALLACEBURG was due to the fog conditions, the southerly wind and the noise made by the Diesel engines.


(e) There is a divergence between the sound signals made by "Trois Rivieres" and those heard by "Wallaceburg". A possible explanation of the two short blasts mentioned by "Wallaceburg" is that the beginning of the Z sounded by "Trois Rivieres" was blotted out by a sound signal from "Wallaceburg", or one of the ships in company, leaving only the two shorts at the end audible.

(f) It is considered that H.M.C.S. "Trois Rivieres" took every reasonable precaution, and was in no way responsible for the collision.


Lieutenant J. Nolan, RCNVR (Temp.), Member.

Lieutenant A.M. Kirkpatrick, RCNVR (Temp.), Member.


Act. Lt. Commdr. J.E. Mitchell, RCNVR (Temp.), Member.


Acting Commander G.P.B. Ashe, R.C.N. (Temp.), President.

THE MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF BOARD OF INQUIRY
HELD ON SHORE AT HALIFAX AT 0930 ON THE 30TH
DAY OF JUNE, 1944.

"To hold a full and careful investigation into
"the circumstances attending the collision involving
"H.M.C.S. "WALLACEBURG" and H.M.C.S. "THREE RIVERS"
"at approximately 0453P on Monday, 26th June, 1944.

PRESIDENT

Acting Commander Gordon Percy Berrsford Ashe, Royal
Canadian Navy (Temporary)

MEMBERS

Acting Lieutenant Commander James Evelyn Mitchell,
Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve (Temporary)

Lieutenant James Nolan, Royal Canadian Naval Reserve
(Temporary)

Lieutenant Archibald Miller Kirkpatrick, Royal Canadian
Naval Volunteer Reserve (Temporary)

NAVAL WITNESSES

Lieutenant Commander Robert Auburn Stewart MacNeil,
Order of the British Empire, Royal Canadian
Naval Reserve (Temporary).

Lieutenant Lorne Donald Gordon Main, Royal Canadian
Naval Volunteer Reserve (Temporary).

Lieutenant Robert Carter Buerk, Royal Canadian Naval
Volunteer Reserve (Temporary).

Electrical Lieutenant Edward John Dickson, Royal
Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve (Temporary).

Edward William Field, Able Seaman, Official Number V-17641.

Alexander Ralph Hays, Leading Signaller V/S II, Official
Number 3384.

Lorne Douglas Cairns, Layer Rating III, Official
Number A-5653

Harry Lake, Engine Room Artificer, Official Number V-42501

Sub-Lieutenant (E) Rupert Ross, Royal Canadian Naval
Volunteer Reserve (Temporary)

Lieutenant William Grant Garden, Royal Canadian Naval
Volunteer Reserve (Temporary)

Acting Lieutenant John Miles Ferguson, Royal Canadian
Naval Volunteer Reserve (Temporary)

Lieutenant Arthur Stephen Dawson, Royal Canadian Naval
Volunteer Reserve (Temporary)

NAVAL WITNESSES

(continued)

Lieutenant Derrick Arthur Woodcroft, Royal Canadian
Naval Volunteer Reserve (Temporary)
Sub-Lieutenant (E) Charles Roach, Royal Canadian
Naval Reserve (Temporary)
Arthur Douglas Hall, Acting Chief Petty Officer,
Official Number A-1557
Wilmar Ash, Leading Signaller, Official Number 4096

NO FURTHER WITNESSES WERE CALLED AND THE BOARD ADJOURNED
AT 1210 ON THE 30TH JUNE, 1944.

Evidence of Lieutenant Commander Robert Auburn Stewart MacNeil, O.B.E., Royal Canadian Naval Reserve (Temporary), Commanding Officer of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "WALLACEBURG"

NAME: Lieutenant Commander Robert Auburn Stewart MacNeil, O.B.E.

CALLED AND CAUTIONED

1. Q. Are you Lieutenant Commander Robert Auburn Stewart MacNeil, O.B.E., Royal Canadian Naval Reserve, (Temporary), Commanding Officer of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "WALLACEBURG"?
A. Yes, Sir.
2. Q. Were you in command of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "WALLACEBURG" on the 26th day of June, at approximately 0450 Atlantic Daylight Time, when the ship came into collision with His Majesty's Canadian Ship "TROIS RIVIERES"?
A. Yes, Sir.
3. Q. Will you give the Board a short account of everything that happened at that time?
A. At 0300P time the 26th instant, H.M.C.S. "WALLACEBURG", in company with H.M.C. Ships "LACHINE" and "WESTMOUNT", slipped from alongside and proceeded in execution of C-in-C, C.N.A.'s 251507Z. At the time of slipping, H.M.C.S. "WALLACEBURG" was berthed on the French Cable fuelling jetty; H.M.C.S. "LACHINE" and "WESTMOUNT" dockyard. At the time of slipping there was a light southerly wind, dense fog, with occasional rain showers which would momentarily increase visibility to between two and three cables. These conditions would last for perhaps a minute, and the fog would shut down again as dense as ever. There was a good deal of merchant shipping anchored in the stream, and a certain amount of active traffic such as the Dartmouth ferries, etcetera, which enjoined extreme caution on the way over the harbour. After being under way for some minutes, H.M.C.S. "LACHINE" and "WESTMOUNT" felt their way into Order One, and the group proceeded down the harbour at the speed of approximately four knots, sounding continuously the requisite sound signals on the sirens. Arrived at the gate, the speed was increased to eight knots. Upon having run the correct distance past Lighthouse Bank Buoy, the speed was increased to ten knots due to the lessening in traffic, the advent of daybreak, and the necessity of getting the group into position with the least possible delay in order to comply with previous orders. A good deal of time had been lost

Evidence of Lieutenant Commander Robert Auburn Stewart
MacNeil, O.B.E., Royal Canadian Naval Reserve (Temporary),
Commanding Officer of His Majesty's Canadian Ship
"WALLACEBURG" - Continued.

3. A. (continued)...due to the slow advance out of the inner harbour. At this time, which was 0442P, the course was altered by a Red turn to 172 degrees. What was apparently a large merchant ship was anchored on the starboard bow, and judging by the emergency signal "U" which was being made to him by sound by the Examination Vessel, he was standing into danger. It would appear that he had got too close to Mars Rock. However, after passing him nothing further was heard of him.

Upon passing Mars Rock buoy, the whistle buoy on Litchfield Shoal was heard on the correct bearing, and a ship indicating by two long blasts that he was stopped, was heard in the vicinity of Neverfail buoy. This is a very common occurrence, as from time to time various motor launches who are on patrol or otherwise occupied, lie in the vicinity of this buoy until the weather clears. Shortly after this the bell buoy on Neverfail Shoal buoy was heard, also on the correct bearing. A Red turn at this time was ordered to 155 degrees, executive signal to follow, my intention being to work the group around this stopped ship by Radar. At 0451P course was altered to 155 degrees and two short blasts sounded on the siren. At this point the ship ahead bore by Radar Red 05 - 450 yards. As the ship steadied up on the new course, two short blasts were heard from the ship ahead, indicating that he had got under way and was altering course to port. Two short blasts were sounded by H.M.C.S. "WALLACEBURG" and the order 'Hard a port' given. As the ship was swinging to port, the white masthead and red port light of the ship ahead (which was subsequently identified as H.M.C.S. "TROIS RIVIERES") were seen, bearing fine on the port bow, indicating that he was passing from starboard to port at a distance of somewhat less than half a cable. The helm was brought immediately to amidships, hard a starboard; one short blast was sounded on the siren; and a few seconds later engines rung to 'Stop'. The red, green, and masthead lights of H.M.C.S. "TROIS RIVIERES" were then observed bearing dead ahead, the engines rung to 'Full astern'. A second or two later the ships collided, almost head on. The stem of H.M.C.S. "WALLACEBURG" struck H.M.C.S. "TROIS RIVIERES" between its stem and starboard anchor. This anchor caused a gash in the bow of H.M.C.S. "WALLACEBURG", and as the ships drew apart, remained imbedded in the ship. Several shackles of cable paid out from H.M.C.S. "TROIS RIVIERES", and as the ships stopped, communication was established by loud hailer. It was decided in view of the considerable traffic then located proceeding up the fairway, to slip both ends of the cable and abandon it in order to get out of

Evidence of Lieutenant Commander Robert Auburn Stewart MacNeil, O.B.E., Royal Canadian Naval Reserve (Temporary), Commanding Officer of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "WALLACEBURG" - Continued.

3. A. (continued)...the position, which was rapidly becoming more dangerous due to the approach of the traffic mentioned above. At this time H.M.C.S. "WESTMOUNT" established contact by V/S and asked if he could be of any assistance. He was told no, and to proceed with H.M.C.S. "LACHINE" in execution of the previous orders referred to above. After about half an hour, cable slipped from H.M.C.S. "WALLACEBURG". Just prior to this, a collision with a large merchant ship proceeding up the fairway was narrowly avoided, as in spite of our sound signals, which were being made by both ships, he did not come astern on his engines until dangerously close. At one point it was necessary to come astern although the ships were still connected by cable. H.M.C.S. "WALLACEBURG" worked her way around the merchant ship stopped off Neverfail and proceeded into the harbour, berthing on H.M.C.S. "TIMMINS" at Jetty One in dense fog at 0655Z. A few minutes after this action took place a signal, priority immediate, was transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Canadian Northwest Atlantic, repeated Captain "D", indicating that the collision had taken place and that it was my intention to return to harbour.
4. Q. Do you have a copy of your sailing orders--the Commander-in-Chief's signal?
- A. Yes, I have an extract of them.
5. Q. Were the ships to be in any specified position at any particular time?
- A. Yes, Sir, we were to be at Halifax Light Ship to carry out a sweep to a depth of 36 miles, an A/S sweep, and return on the same bearing, still sweeping, by a certain hour--1100 our time-- in order to clear the way for a large troop transport.
6. Q. With what Radar are you fitted?
- A. RXC, Sir.
7. Q. What is the approximate effective range for picking up escort vessels?
- A. It varies a great deal, Sir. In this particular instance the gain had been reduced to a minimum to avoid the numerous side echoes which were around us. Actually, the set was being used for navigational purposes. The range would be between 400 and 500 yards.
8. Q. At what range did you first pick up H.M.C.S. "TROIS RIVIERES"?

Evidence of Lieutenant Commander Robert Auburn Stewart
MacNeil, O.B.E., Royal Canadian Naval Reserve (Temporary),
Commanding Officer of His Majesty's Canadian Ship
"WALLACEBURG" - Continued.

8. A. At 450 yards.
9. Q. That was the first?
A. Yes, Sir.
10. Q. What lookouts were placed?
A. There was a lookout on the fo'c's'le, lookouts on each wing of the bridge, and a lookout aft.
11. Q. You were burning navigation lights?
A. Yes, Sir.
12. Q. How were signals passed to the other ships in company?
A. Practically all by R/T, with the exception of one or two which were made by V/S at the gate.
13. Q. Could you see the next astern most of the time?
A. Occasionally, Sir.
14. Q. What is your estimate of the visibility when the collision occurred?
A. Between zero and one, I should say.
15. Q. What was the wind at the time of the collision?
A. Very light and southerly wind--practically negligible.
16. Q. Had you made any sound signals before the two short blasts indicating your alteration of course?
A. Yes, Sir. From the time of leaving the jetty we made continual sound signals in accordance with regulations, indicating a ship under way. These signals were also made by the two other ships in the group.
17. Q. Prior to stopping engines just before the collision, your speed was still ten knots?
A. Ten knots--120 revolutions, Sir.
18. Q. What is the minimum speed at which H.M.C.S. "WALLACEBURG" is manoeuvrable?
A. At slow she handles very sluggishly, Sir.
19. Q. What is that--four or five knots?

Evidence of Lieutenant Commander Robert Auburn Stewart MacNeil, O.B.E., Royal Canadian Naval Reserve (Temporary), Commanding Officer of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "WALLACEBURG" - Continued.

19. A. About four, Sir. She handles better at eight, and I have found it most manoeuvrable at a speed of ten knots.
20. Q. At what time approximately were the two long blasts heard?
- A. This would be when we turned on the Litchfield Bank--no, just after passing Mars Rock buoy. This would be between 0442 and 0451.
21. Q. If the range of your Radar was about 500 yards, did you not consider a speed of ten knots excessive, observing that 500 yards would only be about a minute and a half away at that speed?
- A. No, Sir, because as soon as this turn was made the navigational necessity of using the Radar on low gain would have been unnecessary and the gain would have increased.
22. Q. The rule of the road, article 16, paragraph 2, reads, "A steam vessel hearing, apparently forward of her beam, the fog signal of a vessel the position of which is not ascertained, shall, so far as the circumstances of the case admit, stop her engines and then navigate with caution until the danger of collision is over." Were there any circumstances to prohibit your complying with this regulation when you first heard the two blasts at approximately 0442?
- A. Yes; the fact that the group was coming astern of us, for one thing; and for another, the fact that the position of a previously efficient Radar set enables one to work one's way around, particularly a stopped ship, with absolute accuracy, as I have done many times before.
23. Q. Could the ships astern be advised by R/T that you were stopping your engines?
- A. Yes, Sir.
24. Q. The gain at that time was still in about 500 yards?
- A. Yes, Sir.
25. Q. Were you on the bridge throughout this time?
- A. Yes, Sir.
26. Q. Did you take over from the Officer-of-the-Watch?
- A. I took over, and remained in charge.
27. Q. The helm orders were given by you?
- A. Yes, or at times transmitted by the voice pipe, but they were originally given by me.

Evidence of Lieutenant Commander Robert Auburn Stewart MacNeil, O.B.E., Royal Canadian Naval Reserve (Temporary), Commanding Officer of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "WALLACEBURG" - Continued.

28. Q. Had you heard two long blasts from ahead immediately before the two short blasts?
- A. I don't recall those.
29. Q. Do you consider it possible that what you heard was, in effect, H.M.C.S. "TROIS RIVIERES" sounding "Z"?
- A. No, Sir.
30. Q. Was hydrophone watch being kept?
- A. No, Sir.
31. Q. After you altered course to 155 degrees and were sounding two short blasts, did you see H.M.C.S. "TROIS RIVIERES" at all?
- A. No, we made our first alteration--it was a Red turn. Just as we steadied up she still was not in sight, and we heard these short blasts.
32. Q. But you didn't actually sight H.M.C.S. "TROIS RIVIERES"?
- A. No, not until the ship was swinging on the second alteration to port, which was made in view of his two short blasts.
33. Q. After going hard a port, had the ship swung appreciably before you reversed the helm?
- A. No, Sir, she was just taking it up.
34. Q. So that up to the time of collision there had been no great change in your course? You were still on approximately 155 degrees at the time of the collision?
- A. Yes, Sir. Taking into consideration the movement of the helm, we were just about there.

WITNESS WITHDREW AND ELECTED TO REMAIN.

Evidence of Lieutenant Lorne Donald Gordon Main, Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve (Temporary), of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "WALLACEBURG"

NAME: Lieutenant Lorne Donald Gordon Main.

CALLED AND CAUTIONED.

35. Q. Are you Lieutenant Lorne Donald Gordon Main, Royal

Evidence of Lieutenant Lorne Donald Gordon Main, Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve (Temporary), of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "WALLACEBURG" - Continued.

35. Q. (continued)...Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve (Temporary), of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "WALLACEBURG"?
- A. Yes, Sir.
36. Q. Were you serving in H.M.C.S. "WALLACEBURG" on the 26th day of June at the time of the collision with H.M.C.S. "TROIS RIVIERES"?
- A. Yes, Sir.
37. Q. Were you on the bridge at the time?
- A. Yes, Sir.
38. Q. Did you keep in your note book a record of courses and speeds?
- A. Yes, Sir. I had another officer, Lieutenant R. A. Francis, assisting; he was writing it down.
39. Q. You did have a record stating times, courses, and speeds? The log presumably notes these "as requisite".
- A. Yes, Sir.
40. Q. Can you produce that record?
- A. Yes, Sir.
41. Q. Will you tell the Board exactly what happened from the time of reaching the gate?
- A. We continued on course 159 degrees until we had run the correct distance by Lighthouse Bank buoy. The speed was increased at 0441P to 120 revolutions. At 0442P the course was altered to 172 degrees true. We heard a merchant ship on the starboard bow under way giving its sound signals, indicating she was under way, and the Examination Vessel exchanging signals with her indicating she was standing into danger, since the sound signals were a series of "U's". At 0451 course was altered to 155 degrees true, and just prior to this a sound signal of a ship ahead or in the vicinity of Neverfail buoy was heard, namely, two long blasts. Two short blasts were heard ahead from the same ship--apparently the same ship, and a matter of seconds then we altered course again to port, at least the helm order 'Hard a port' was given, and then the mast-head light and port red light of the ship ahead were sighted at approximately 100 yards. The helm order 'Hard a starboard' was given, engines rung to 'Stop' and to 'Full astern', also one short blast on the siren. At approximately 0452 we struck H.M.C.S. "TROIS RIVIERES" almost stem to stem. I immediately left the bridge, as I am also in the capacity of First Lieutenant on board, to ascertain the damage forward.

Evidence of Lieutenant Lorne Donald Gordon Main, Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve (Temporary), of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "WALLACEBURG" - Continued.

42. Q. Who saw the lights?
- A. We saw them simultaneously, practically.
43. Q. Did the fo'c's'le report them also?
- A. He reported them, but we saw them simultaneously, and I ordered him off the fo'c's'le.
44. Q. Were the sound signals clearly heard?
- A. Yes, Sir, they were fairly distinct of the merchant ship, X-V and the ship ahead.
45. Q. You heard no long blasts immediately prior to the two short blasts?
- A. Well, yes, Sir, just prior to the alteration of course.
46. Q. Yes, but you heard the two long blasts somewhat previous to the two short blasts?
- A. Yes, Sir.
47. Q. What is your estimate of the visibility at the time of the collision?
- A. Between zero and one, Sir.
48. Q. Were there any other fog signals heard just about the time you heard these two short blasts?
- A. No, Sir, just the ringing of the bells by the merchant ships at anchor.
49. Q. Could you hear this sound above the ringing of the bells--that is, the sound of these ships?
- A. Yes, Sir.
50. Q. Could you see if the "TROIS RIVIERES" was moving and in what direction, just prior to the collision?
- A. I estimated she just had way on and that is all.
51. Q. Way ahead?
- A. Ahead, Sir.
52. Q. And she was moving ahead?
- A. Yes, Sir.
53. Q. As Navigating Officer were you offering advice to the Captain?
- A. No, Sir.

Evidence of Lieutenant Lorne Donald Gordon Main, Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve (Temporary), of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "WALLACEBURG" - Continued.

54. Q. Did you suggest altering to starboard?
- A. Just prior to the collision? It was a matter of thirty seconds, the orders were given.
55. Q. Was any attempt made to work the engines--I mean one astern, two astern?
- A. Both put to 'Stop' and both 'Full astern', and had there been time, 'Double full astern'.
56. Q. In the dense fog what did you estimate the ship's position to be--starboard or port side of the channel?
- A. When we hit, Sir?
57. Q. Yes.
- A. The starboard side of the channel. That is our own ship?
58. Q. Yes.
- A. We were almost in the centre, slightly port side.
59. Q. You checked the course on the chart?
- A. Yes, the courses were laid on the chart.
60. Q. Have you brought the chart?
- A. The charts are here, but I am not certain the courses are still there. I can reconstruct it if you wish.

(WITNESS DRAWS COURSE ON CHART)

Past Mars Rock we headed well over to the west of the channel. We came down on our course 172 degrees. We allowed three degrees to pick up these by. Also I have always noticed a set on shore there. At approximately this position I heard Litchfield Shoal buoy. After this we also heard Neverfail buoy on correct bearing. That was the point where we altered 153 degrees, allowing two degrees for this ship which we heard. We ran down the fairway.

61. Q. Were you at that point before altering to 155, in Radar contact with the ship?
- A. No, Sir.
62. Q. The alterations were made without checking her exact position?
- A. Actually, Sir, I had Radar searching on the port

Evidence of Lieutenant Lorne Donald Gordon Main, Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve (Temporary), of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "WALLACEBURG" - Continued.

62. A. bow for Neverfail buoy. We picked up the sight of this ship ahead, and swung around to get true bearing. He called to the bridge Red 05 - 450 yards, just at the time we were blowing our siren. It wasn't heard--I never heard it--whether the Captain did or not I don't know. The next report was 300 yards.

63. Q. Was the position where the Dan buoy was laid approximately the position where the collision took place?

A. I didn't see the Dan buoy laid; when we came in I took as close a bearing as possible. I was on the fo'c's'le at that time, and I didn't see it. We reported it when we came into harbour.

WITNESS WITHDREW AND ELECTED TO REMAIN.

Evidence of Lieutenant Robert Carter Buerk, Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve (Temporary), of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "WALLACEBURG"

NAME: Lieutenant Robert Carter Buerk.

CALLED AND CAUTIONED.

64. Q. Are you Lieutenant Robert Carter Buerk, Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve (Temporary), of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "WALLACEBURG"?

A. I am.

65. Q. Were you serving in His Majesty's Canadian Ship "WALLACEBURG" on the 26th day of June, at the time of the collision with His Majesty's Canadian Ship "TROIS RIVIERES"?

A. Yes, Sir.

66. Q. What were your duties at that time?

A. I was assisting the Captain, Sir, on the voice pipe--helm orders, engine orders.

67. Q. Will you give the Board a short account of everything that occurred from the time of passing Mars Rock?

A. It doesn't differ at all from what the Navigator and the Captain gave, Sir.

Evidence of Lieutenant Robert Carter Buerk, Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve (Temporary), of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "WALLACEBURG" - Continued.

68. Q. I think you had better run through it.
- A. We approached Mars Rock, and a large merchant ship was contacted. We heard sound signals with the X-V. We didn't hear any more after the X-V until the Examination Vessel gave him a "U". Past Mars Rock buoy we heard Litchfield Shoal buoy, and we heard Neverfail Shoal buoy on the correct bearing.
69. Q. Did you not previously hear the sound signal from another ship?
- A. We heard sound signals from this convoy, Sir, and ships at anchor.
70. Q. When were the two long blasts heard, do you remember?
- A. No, I can't remember exactly at what time, Sir.
71. Q. Did you hear any "Z's"?
- A. I can tell you approximately. We were right close to Neverfail buoy when we heard the two long blasts.
72. Q. When were the two short blasts heard?
- A. The two short blasts were heard--the ones from H.M.C.S. "TROIS RIVIERES" were heard at approximately 0452, I believe.
73. Q. How long would you say before the collision?
- A. A very few minutes, Sir.
74. Q. Had you heard any other sound signals immediately prior to that?
- A. No, Sir.
75. Q. Did subsequent events disclose any other ship in the vicinity at the time besides your group and H.M.C.S. "TROIS RIVIERES"?
- A. Yes, we could hear an incoming convoy sounding.
76. Q. At the same time or later?
- A. At the same time, and we could hear X-V sounding X-V at intervals of three or four minutes.
77. Q. How many series of two long blasts did you hear?
- A. I heard one.
78. Q. Only one, and one series of two short blasts from that bearing?
- A. Yes.

Evidence of Lieutenant Robert Carter Buerk, Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve (Temporary), of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "WALLACEBURG" - Continued.

79. Q. There was never any doubt in your own mind that they were two short blasts?
- A. They were quite distinct.
80. Q. At the time you heard these two short blasts, did you see the ship?
- A. No, I didn't see the ship until after.
81. Q. At the time you heard these short blasts, did you alter course?
- A. We altered course to port.
82. Q. Did you give any blasts?
- A. Yes, we gave two short blasts.
83. Q. And you still couldn't see him?
- A. No, we couldn't see him until he was about 100 yards away.
84. Q. How many vessels did you see in the vicinity?
- A. I would say there was a small convoy coming in, the X-V, and this big merchant ship near Mars Rock, and several ships near the gate--we could hear the bells.
85. Q. The convoy was near your ship?
- A. The convoy seemed to be a bit to starboard.

WITNESS WITHDREW AND ELECTED TO REMAIN.

Evidence of Lieutenant (E1) Edward John Dickson, Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve (Temporary), of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "WALLACEBURG".

NAME: Lieutenant (E1) Edward John Dickson.

CALLED AND CAUTIONED

86. Q. Are you Lieutenant (E1) Edward John Dickson, Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve (Temporary), of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "WALLACEBURG"?
- A. I am.
87. Q. Were you serving in His Majesty's Canadian Ship "WALLACEBURG" on the 26th day of June, at the time of the collision between His Majesty's Canadian Ships "WALLACEBURG" and "TROIS RIVIERES"?
- A. I was, Sir.

Evidence of Lieutenant (E1) Edward John Dickson, Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve (Temporary), of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "WALLACEBURG" - Continued.

88. Q. What were your duties at the time?

A. I am Group Radar Officer on board H.M.C.S. "WALLACEBURG", Sir.

89. Q. Were you on the bridge?

A. I was on the bridge, Sir.

90. Q. Will you tell the Board how the Radar was employed, and with what results, from the time of leaving the gate?

A. We had been using Radar for navigating out the gate and picking up buoys wherever we could in order to find out our exact position. May I give a resume on the RXC? The side echoes on the set are very pronounced. Normally the range of the set is quite good, but in order to do away with these side echoes when you are in harbour, the gain must be continually manipulated. When the gain is turned down the range is decreased by a terrific amount. We had not sighted Litchfield Shoal buoy, and the Radar had been given an order to sweep up the port side and find this buoy, and his gain was down in order to do this, and he found the side echo of a fairly large ship which he thought closing about 72 degrees from the bearing.

91. Q. I think you have made an error there. Litchfield Shoal would have been on your starboard bow.

A. Neverfail is the one I mean, Sir. He saw this side echo, and trained as early and as rapidly as he could to find the proper bearing, but the side echoes don't exist all the way around. They are about ten degrees apart, and the gain must be manipulated on each one, and he found that the true bearing was about Red 05, and as he gave his first report we blew our siren. His first report was not heard due to our whistle being blown, and by the time he was able to get the report to the bridge the other ship was about five degrees on the port bow and closing. Very shortly after that, Sir, the other ship came in sight.

92. Q. The Radar was being used, then, to search for buoys and not other ships?

A. No, Sir. We had wanted to determine our position from Neverfail Shoal, and consequently had ordered the operator to sweep up the port side in order to find the buoy.

93. Q. The gain had been reduced?

A. The gain had to be reduced in order to carry out that search, Sir. Normally the set was on an all-round sweep, Sir.

Evidence of Lieutenant (E1) Edward John Dickson, Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve (Temporary), of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "WALLACEBURG" - Continued.

94. Q. At what range would it normally pick up an escort ship?
- A. Normally at 10,000 yards, or greater, Sir.
95. Q. Even close to land?
- A. If it was 10,000 yards, Sir, he would pick it up, but if it was at the same range he would not.
96. Q. Had you picked up any previously?
- A. Green 70 of this large merchant ship which had been sounding off Mars Rock--he had picked that up, Sir.
97. Q. In sweeping for Neverfail buoy, did you get a bearing or distance on it?
- A. I don't think he ever found that, Sir. He was searching for it when this ship came in sight. I was not in the Radar hut.
98. Q. In your own experience with this particular set, have the ranges been accurate?
- A. The ranges on this set are more accurate than any other set in the Canadian Navy, and should have an absolute accuracy of plus or minus 50 yards.
99. Q. But in your own experience you are quite sure this set was accurate?
- A. The set was accurate, Sir.

WITNESS WITHDREW AND ELECTED TO REMAIN.

Evidence of Able Seaman Edward William Field, Official Number V-17641, of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "WALLACEBURG".

NAME: Edward William Field.

CALLED AND CAUTIONED.

100. Q. Are you Edward William Field, Able Seaman, Official Number V-17641, of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "WALLACEBURG"?
- A. Yes, Sir.
101. Q. Were you serving in His Majesty's Canadian Ship "WALLACEBURG" on the 26th day of June at the time of the collision with His Majesty's Canadian Ship "TROIS RIVIERES"?
- A. I was, Sir.

Evidence of Able Seaman Edward William Field, Official Number V-17641, of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "WALLACEBURG" - Continued.

102. Q. What were your duties immediately prior to the collision?

A. I was operating the Radar, Sir.

103. Q. Will you tell the Board what orders you received shortly prior to the collision, and what results you obtained?

A. I was told to sweep on the port bow in search of a buoy, to try and pick up a small buoy, and I couldn't find one.

104. Q. What did you find?

A. When I got up pretty close to the bow--I don't remember the exact bearing--I noticed an echo at approximately, or slightly over, 500 yards.

105. Q. Did you note the time?

A. We had no clock in the Radar hut, Sir.

106. Q. Did you report it immediately?

A. I reported it as fast as I could.

107. Q. How long--a few seconds?

A. Maybe two or three seconds. I got the bearing and range and called the bridge. They answered me, and just then there was a long blast and they couldn't hear me, and in the meantime we had closed 100 yards, and the first report I got to the bridge was Red 05 - 400 yards.

108. Q. Who was at the bridge end of the Radar voice pipe--a rating?

A. No, Sir, I believe the First Lieutenant answered and told me to try and pick up the buoy. I am pretty sure it was the First Lieutenant, but I wouldn't swear to it.

109. Q. Is there normally a communications rating at the end of that voice pipe?

A. No, there isn't normally, Sir.

110. Q. You said your report was interrupted by a long blast?

A. One long blast, Sir.

111. Q. From your own ship?

A. Yes, Sir.

WITNESS WITHDREW.

Evidence of Alexander Ralph Hays, Leading Signaller, Official Number 3384, Acting Yeoman, of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "WALLACEBURG".

NAME: Alexander Ralph Hays.

CALLED AND CAUTIONED.

112. Q. Are you Alexander Ralph Hays, Leading Signaller, Official Number 3384, Acting Yeoman of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "WALLACEBURG"?
- A. Yes, Sir.
113. Q. Were you serving in His Majesty's Canadian Ship "WALLACEBURG" on the 26th day of June, at the time of the collision with His Majesty's Canadian Ship "TROIS RIVIERES"?
- A. I was, Sir.
114. Q. What is your estimate of the visibility at the time?
- A. I wouldn't say over half a cable, Sir.
115. Q. Did you hear any sound signals in the ten minutes preceding the collision?
- A. One long blast, Sir, sounded ahead of us, and just as we sighted it, one short blast.
116. Q. One long blast and one short blast? You are sure of that?
- A. I am sure of it, Sir.
117. Q. Could you identify from what ship the long blast and short blast came?
- A. No, I couldn't say, Sir.
118. Q. Were they both more or less ahead?
- A. Yes; there was a merchant ship blowing off to port, and there was the X-V and our own group which would come up at regular intervals with theirs.
119. Q. And up to the time of the collision these were the only sound signals?
- A. They sounded their short blasts for gate closing. This merchant vessel was blowing "Z's" and the Examination Vessel was making "X-V - Standing into danger".
120. Q. Immediately prior to the collision, could you hear those vessels?
- A. You could hear them on our port beam.

Evidence of Alexander Ralph Hays, Leading Signalman, Official Number 3384, Acting Yeoman of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "WALLACEBURG" - Continued.

121. Q. The sound signals that appeared to come from the position before the beam were one long blast and one short blast? Were they repeated at all?
- A. Not to my knowledge, Sir. They were not repeated.
122. Q. You saw the collision?
- A. I was talking to the Signalman on the port wing, Sir, and I was coming forward. I didn't see the ship; she was reported before I got up.
123. Q. Was H.M.C.S. "TROIS RIVIERES" moving or was she stopped?
- A. I would say she had way on, Sir. I jumped up on the chart table at the time of the collision, and when she backed off I read her pendants.
124. Q. How were you signalling to the other ships in your group?
- A. By R/T. We used V/S once to H.M.C.S. "LACHINE", but we had used R/T except for that. We were giving blasts every two minutes.
125. Q. Did you not at any time hear two long blasts from a ship?
- A. I did not hear it, Sir. I have no recollection of it.
126. Q. After some interval of time you heard again one short blast?
- A. Yes, Sir.
127. Q. Did you at any time hear two short blasts?
- A. Not to my knowledge, Sir. I was talking to the Signalman, and when I came up at the time of the collision I was right behind the Captain...
128. Q. The question is of your hearing one long or two long, one short or two short blasts.
- A. No, Sir, I didn't.

WITNESS WITHDREW.

Evidence of Lorne Douglas Cairns, Layer Rating III, Official Number A-5653, of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "WALLACEBURG".

NAME: Lorne Douglas Cairns.

CALLED AND CAUTIONED.

Evidence of Lorne Douglas Cairns, Layer Rating III, Official Number A-5653, of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "WALLACEBURG" - Continued.

129. Q. Are you Lorne Douglas Cairns, Layer Rating III, Official Number A-5653, of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "WALLACEBURG"?
- A. I am, Sir.
130. Q. Were you serving in His Majesty's Canadian Ship "WALLACEBURG" on the 26th day of June, at the time of the collision with His Majesty's Canadian Ship "TROIS RIVIERES"?
- A. Yes, Sir.
131. Q. What were your duties at that time?
- A. I was helmsman, Sir, at the wheel.
132. Q. Can you remember what orders you received during the five minutes prior to the collision. What course were you steering?
- A. I was steering course of 155, Sir. And then I got an order 'Hard a port', Sir. Then 'Amidships' and 'Hard a starboard'.
133. Q. Had the ship swung appreciably to port before the helm was reversed?
- A. She had just started to swing.
134. Q. Had she swung far to starboard?
- A. No, Sir. Not far.
135. Q. Were the engine orders passed to you?
- A. They were passed to me, and I repeated the orders.
136. Q. The first one was 'Stop'. When was that?
- A. Just as soon as I started to swing to port, Sir. Then the other was 'Full astern'.
137. Q. You received that order after 'Hard a starboard'?
- A. Yes, Sir.

WITNESS WITHDREW.

Evidence of Lieutenant Lorne Donald Gordon Main, Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve (Temporary), of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "WALLACEBURG" - RECALLED.

138. Q. You stated that you instructed the Radar to look for Neverfail buoy?
- A. Yes, Sir.

Evidence of Lieutenant Lorne Donald Gordon Main, Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve (Temporary), of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "WALLACEBURG" - RECALLED - Continued.

139. Q. You did not know the exact position of the ship on Neverfail buoy?
- A. I asked the Radar if they could pick up the buoy on the port bow. I said, "Investigate and report". I was absolutely sure of the position, and just after we picked up that position I heard the bell buoy ringing.
140. Q. Did you at any time advise the Commanding Officer to reduce speed?
- 5 A. No, Sir.

WITNESS WITHDREW AND ELECTED TO REMAIN.

Evidence of Harry Lake, Engine Room Artificer, Official Number V-42501, of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "WALLACEBURG".

141. Q. Are you Harry Lake, Engine Room Artificer, Official Number V-42501, of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "WALLACEBURG"?
- A. Yes, Sir.
142. Q. Were you serving in His Majesty's Canadian Ship "WALLACEBURG" on the 26th day of June, at the time of the collision with His Majesty's Canadian Ship "TROIS RIVIERES"?
- A. I was, Sir.
143. Q. What were your duties at that time?
- A. I was Engine Room Artificer of the Watch, Sir.
144. Q. Is there an Engineer Officer on board H.M.C.S. "WALLACEBURG"?
- A. Yes, Sir.
145. Q. Was he there at the time?
- A. No, Sir.
146. Q. You were in charge of machinery?
- A. Yes, Sir.
147. Q. How many revolutions were you doing about five minutes before the collision?
- A. We were turning up about 70 or 90 revolutions-- I am not just sure.
148. Q. Do you know what speed that gives?
- A. No, I don't.

Evidence of Harry Lake, Engine Room Artificer, Official
Number V-42501, of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "WALLACEBURG"
- Continued.

149. Q. Is the speed recorded in the Engine Room Register--
have you that here?

A. I believe the Engineer Officer has it, Sir. The
speed is not recorded, Sir, just the revolutions.

(ENGINE ROOM REGISTER PRODUCED)

It was 120 revolutions, Sir. At 0440 we moved up
to 120 revolutions.

150. Q. What orders did you receive immediately prior to
the collision?

A. We received the orders 'Stop engines' and then
immediately we got 'Full astern' and then almost
immediately after that we got 'Stop engines' again.

151. Q. Was there any delay in stopping the engines or
putting them astern?

A. No, Sir, there was not.

152. Q. That was done almost immediately you received the
order?

A. Yes, Sir.

WITNESS WITHDREW.

Evidence of Sub-Lieutenant (E) Rupert Ross, Royal Canadian
Naval Volunteer Reserve (Temporary), of His Majesty's Canadian
Ship "WALLACEBURG"

NAME: Sub-Lieutenant (E) Rupert Ross.

CALLED AND CAUTIONED.

153. Q. Are you Sub-Lieutenant (E) Rupert Ross, Royal
Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve (Temporary), of
His Majesty's Canadian Ship "WALLACEBURG"?

A. Yes, Sir.

154. Q. Were you serving in His Majesty's Canadian Ship
"WALLACEBURG" on the 26th day of June, 1944, at
the time of the collision with His Majesty's
Canadian Ship "TROIS RIVIERES"?

A. I was, Sir.

155. Q. Were you in the Engine Room at the time?

A. No, Sir, I had just turned in. The Chief Engine
Room Artificer was just above the Engine Room
hatch.

Evidence of Sub-Lieutenant (E) Rupert Ross, Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve (Temporary), of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "WALLACEBURG" - Continued.

156. Q. You had been in the Engine Room previously?
A. Yes, Sir, I went to turn in about 0415.
157. Q. That was about an hour and a quarter after slipping?
A. That's right, Sir.
158. Q. You do not consider it necessary to remain in the Engine Room when you have run into thick weather?
A. No, Sir, not if the Chief Engine Room Artificer is in my place.
159. Q. What was the normal complement in the Engine Room at the time you turned in?
A. One Engine Room Artificer, one Leading Stoker, and one Stoker.
160. Q. You consider that quite satisfactory to man the Engine Room?
A. Yes; entering harbour or in fog, the Chief Engine Room Artificer is handy at the time. He is just above the Engine Room hatch.
161. Q. Is 'Full astern, full ahead' when you are manoeuvring an emergency signal?
A. It is, Sir.
162. Q. Not by a double ring?
A. The telegraphs ring full ahead or astern in an emergency.
163. Q. Are you acquainted with Article in B.R. 16 regarding an Engineer Officer being in the Engine Room at all times during manoeuvres?
A. I am, Sir.

WITNESS WITHDREW AND ELECTED TO REMAIN.

Evidence of Lieutenant William Grant Garden, Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve (Temporary), Commanding Officer of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "TROIS RIVIERES"

NAME: Lieutenant William Grant Garden.

CALLED AND CAUTIONED.

164. Q. Are you Lieutenant William Grant Garden, Royal

Evidence of Lieutenant William Grant Garden, Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve (Temporary), Commanding Officer of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "TROIS RIVIERES" - Continued.

164. Q. (continued)...Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve (Temporary), Commanding Officer of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "TROIS RIVIERES"?
- A. I am, Sir.
165. Q. Were you in command of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "TROIS RIVIERES" on the 26th day of June, at the time of the collision with His Majesty's Canadian Ship "WALLACEBURG"?
- A. I was, Sir.
166. Q. Will you tell the Board everything that occurred in the half hour prior to the collision?
- A. We had been escorting convoy J.H. 109 from St. John's, Newfoundland, and had arrived at Halifax Number Six Light Vessel at approximately four minutes past two o'clock Atlantic Daylight Time. H.M.C.S. "TROIS RIVIERES" had run ahead of S.S. "IMPEROYL" down the swept channel in the direction of "A" buoy. Visibility had been extremely poor all the way in from the Light Vessel. It is recorded in our Log as F.1. "A" buoy was reached and the course was set from there to the Inner Automatic. We arrived at the Inner Automatic at approximately 0329, where engines were stopped. The Pilot Vessel then came alongside, and we directed him to the "IMPEROYL". The fog had not abated by this time, and as it was still dark I decided to remain inside of the Inner Automatic until conditions were more favourable. At 0432 course of 333 degrees was shaped for Neverfail, and both engines rung to 'Slow ahead'. 'Slow ahead' gives us 150 revolutions or a speed of approximately seven knots. Our engines are Diesel and this is about our minimum speed. Engines were stopped when we arrived at Neverfail, and there were several merchant ships anchored in the vicinity. They remained stopped for some two minutes, and then they were rung to 'Slow ahead'. They were only allowed to run for a period of half a minute, and they were stopped again. Finally, at 0450 they were re-started and a course of 354 degrees was shaped for the gate. At 0452½ a light was reported dead ahead by Lieutenant Woodcroft on the fo'c's'le. This light was also seen by Lieutenant Ferguson on the bridge, and the reports were more or less simultaneous. As soon as the light was reported, both engines were stopped. That was at 0452½. Some seconds later they were rung to 'Half astern' and three short blasts were sounded on the air siren. At 0453 a ship was reported dead ahead, and both engines were rung to 'Full astern'. Three short blasts were again given on the siren. At 0453½ the two ships came into collision, bow to bow. They drew rapidly apart after the collision, and both engines were stopped. During our trip in from Inner Automatic

Evidence of Lieutenant William Grant Garden, Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve (Temporary), Commanding Officer of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "TROIS RIVIERES" - Continued.

166. A. (continued)...one long blast was sounded while the ship was under way, and two when the vessel was stopped. Slightly before sighting H.M.C.S. "WALLACEBURG" two "Z's" had been blown on the air horn, to endeavour to attract the attention of the Examination Vessel. The Radar was closed up, but unfortunately was of little use because it is the SW2C type, and it has been our experience that once inside Chebucto Head the ground echoes interfere with proper operation of the set. The Asdic was closed up and a sweep of approximately Red 20 to Green 20 had been ordered. Two buoys had been picked up and reported by the Asdic. Besides the Commanding Officer, there were Lieutenant Ferguson, the Officer-of-the-Watch, and Lieutenant Dawson, the Navigating Officer, on the bridge; Lieutenant Woodcroft was on the fo'c's'le with the lookout, and special sea duty men were closed up for entering harbour. It is quite difficult to hear horns or sirens from other ships or Shore stations, due to the fact that the Diesel engines are so noisy.
167. Q. Had you taken over from the Officer-of-the-Watch?
- A. I had, Sir.
168. Q. And all orders were originated by you?
- A. All orders were originated by me, Sir.
169. Q. Do you know exactly what time you had sounded the "Z's"?
- A. I can't say exactly, Sir. It was before sighting H.M.C.S. "WALLACEBURG'S" light.
170. Q. About two or three minutes, or five or six, before the collision?
- A. I would say not more than two, Sir.
171. Q. Did you notice whether the "Z" had been properly given? Was there a pause between the two longs and shorts?
- A. On our ship we have two lanyards which are forward to the bridge, and it is necessary for the Officer-of-the-Watch to blow it, and I blew all sound signals myself. It is hard to blow them from the rear of the bridge.
172. Q. Were any sound signals made after making the "Z's" prior to the collision?
- A. I really don't remember, Sir. The last one I remember making was the "Z"--that is, outside of the three short blasts.

Evidence of Lieutenant William Grant Garden, Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve (Temporary), Commanding Officer of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "TROIS RIVIERES" - Continued.

173. Q. You did not sound one or two short blasts at any time?
- A. No, Sir, at no time.
174. Q. Did you hear any sound signals coming from a group of two or three or four ships?
- A. I really can't say, Sir. I believe I remember hearing a siren very faintly and far in the distance before H.M.C.S. "WALLACEBURG's" light was seen. I am not positive, but I believe I do remember it, and then after H.M.C.S. "WALLACEBURG"--after a light was seen, I heard one short blast shortly before we came into the collision.
175. Q. What was your reason for going ahead and stopping again?
- A. To keep way on my ship, and so that if anything was sighted I could either bring it to a stop or go astern, and also to listen.
176. Q. During that period you were stopped, did you hear any call signals?
- A. The only thing I heard were other ships' bells ringing. They were close--anchored. Also Neverfail buoy.
177. Q. Could you hear Neverfail buoy under way?
- A. I believe we could hear Neverfail buoy when the engines were going.
178. Q. Before you made this course to 335, how was your ship's head? How did you have to bring your ship around to make that course?
- A. To starboard--333 to 335.
179. Q. At no time then, were you actually turning to port?
- A. Prior to the collision, no.
180. Q. Your main turn to that course was a turn to starboard?
- A. Yes, a turn to starboard from 333 to 335.
181. Q. When you heard Neverfail buoy, did it seem close or some distance away?
- A. Neverfail sounded quite close. I would estimate we passed it about one cable's distance.
182. Q. You didn't see the buoy?
- A. I personally didn't see it, Sir.

Evidence of Lieutenant William Grant Garden, Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve (Temporary), Commanding Officer of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "TROIS RIVIERES" - Continued.

183. Q. Did anyone on the bridge see it?

A. As far as I know, no one saw it. I believe I remember asking if anyone saw it. Oh, excuse me, Sir, I believe we did see the light on it.

184. Q. Do you consider that you were on one side or other of the channel, or in the centre of it?

A. I would say slightly to starboard coming in.

185. Q. As your ship swung on to that course, did you make any sound signal indicating alteration of course?

A. I didn't give one short blast, no.

WITNESS WITHDREW AND ELECTED TO REMAIN.

Evidence of Acting Lieutenant John Miles Ferguson, Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve (Temporary), of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "TROIS RIVIERES".

NAME: Acting Lieutenant John Miles Ferguson.

CALLED AND CAUTIONED.

186. Q. Are you Acting Lieutenant John Miles Ferguson, Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve (Temporary), of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "TROIS RIVIERES"?

A. I am, Sir.

187. Q. Were you serving in His Majesty's Canadian Ship "TROIS RIVIERES" on the 26th day of June, 1944, at the time of the collision with His Majesty's Canadian Ship "WALLACEBURG"?

A. I was, Sir.

188. Q. What were your duties?

A. I was Officer-of-the-Watch, Sir.

189. Q. Will you give a short account of events immediately prior to the collision?

A. After we left Inner Automatic we had stopped quite often to listen for sound signals, and we had run across quite a bit of shipping anchored. Visibility was very poor; we could hear their bells, and we picked up Neverfail buoy. We stopped for a period

Evidence of Acting Lieutenant John Miles Ferguson, Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve (Temporary), of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "TROIS RIVIERES" - Continued.

189. A. (continued)...in the vicinity of the buoy. At this time we were blowing for the Examination Vessel. We had then gone slow ahead on the course for the gate; then I spotted a light dead ahead; at the same time the forward lookout and Lieutenant Woodcroft reported it to the Captain. He immediately saw it, stopped both engines, and then a matter of seconds later, went half astern. It was a matter of half a minute when the ship appeared--H.M.C.S. "WALLACEBURG"--out of the fog. The Captain immediately rang full astern, and it was a good half minute before the collision took place. That is right up to the time of the collision, Sir.
190. Q. Could you hear any sound signals from ahead at all?
- A. Just shortly after I spotted the light I heard one long blast.
191. Q. And prior to that you had not heard any?
- A. I think there was one short blast just before the collision.
192. Q. But prior to sighting the light?
- A. No, Sir, all we could hear were the bells of the anchored ships.
193. Q. Did you hear the sound signals made in your own ship?
- A. Yes, Sir.
194. Q. Approximately how long before the collision were the "Z's" sounded?
- A. Two to two and a half minutes, Sir. We were right in the vicinity of Neverfail buoy when we tried to get the Examination Vessel.
195. Q. Except for the three short blasts sounded when you put your engines astern, were short blasts sounded at any other time?
- A. No, Sir.
196. Q. Did you hear the Examination Vessel sounding off?
- A. We did not, Sir. We were listening for that.
197. Q. When you were close to Neverfail buoy, did you see it or was it reported to you?
- A. As I remember, I saw the light on the starboard beam.
198. Q. Did you hear the bell?
- A. We could hear the bell, yes.

WITNESS WITHDREW AND ELECTED TO REMAIN.

Evidence of Lieutenant Arthur Stephen Dawson, Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve (Temporary), of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "TROIS RIVIERES"

NAME: Lieutenant Arthur Stephen Dawson.

CALLED AND CAUTIONED

199. Q. Are you Lieutenant Arthur Stephen Dawson, Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve (Temporary), of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "TROIS RIVIERES"?
- A. I am.
200. Q. Were you serving in His Majesty's Canadian Ship "TROIS RIVIERES" on the 26th day of June, 1944?
- A. Yes, Sir.
201. Q. What were your duties immediately prior to the collision with His Majesty's Canadian Ship "WALLACEBURG"?
- A. Navigating Officer, Sir.
202. Q. Will you give the Board a short account of events after passing the Inner Automatic buoy?
- A. We left the Inner Automatic buoy on a course of 333 true, Sir, at 0432P, and proceeded with engines slow ahead. At Neverfail buoy engines were stopped, and the buoy was in sight first on the starboard bow and later on the starboard beam, I would say at about half a cable's distance. Engines were stopped at the buoy for two minutes, then started slow ahead for a period of half a minute, when they were stopped for two and a half minutes, during which time a number of "Z's" were sounded to attract the attention of the X.V.--I am not sure just how many. About two and a half minutes before the collision, Mr. Woodcroft on the fo'c's'le reported a light dead ahead, and this time engines were stopped, and some seconds later the engines were rung to half astern--both engines. Approximately half a minute before the collision the fo'c's'le reported a vessel in sight dead ahead. The engines were then rung to full astern. At the time they were rung half astern, three short blasts were sounded, and when rung full astern three short blasts were again sounded. Shortly after going full astern H.M.C.S. "WALLACEBURG" was plainly visible in the fog ahead, and a collision was made possibly half a minute later. As far as I could observe by looking at the water over the port side, the ship had stern way on a few seconds before the collision.
203. Q. When the ship was stopped, did the ship's head pay off appreciably?
- A. It paid off slightly, Sir.

Evidence of Lieutenant Arthur Stephen Dawson, Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve (Temporary), of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "TROIS RIVIERES" - Continued.

204. Q. Which way?

A. My recollection is not very clear, Sir, but I believe it paid off to port.

205. Q. Were any reports received from the Radar?

A. Mr. Ferguson, the Officer-of-the-Watch, was standing by the voice pipe from the Radar, Sir. I believe he was receiving reports, but I didn't receive them.

206. Q. Did you notice the sound signals being made by your own ship?

A. Yes, Sir.

207. Q. Was there any possibility of mistaking the "Z's" for another signal?

A. I would say none, Sir.

208. Q. Did you hear the fog signals from other ships immediately prior--in the five minutes preceding the collision?

A. I heard anchor bells from the merchant vessels at anchor in the vicinity of Neverfail buoy, and approximately at the time that H.M.C.S. "WALLACEBURG's" light was sighted I heard one blast which I presume came from H.M.C.S. "WALLACEBURG". I don't recall any other signals.

209. Q. That long blast came from the direction of H.M.C.S. "WALLACEBURG"?

A. Yes, Sir. I am satisfied it was from her.

WITNESS WITHDREW AND ELECTED TO REMAIN.

Evidence of Acting Lieutenant John Miles Ferguson, Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve (Temporary), of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "TROIS RIVIERES" - RECALLED.

210. Q. Were any reports received from the Radar?

A. Our Radar was very poor. The last report I had was the convoy departing from us when we were around Inner Automatic. I held it there for a little better than a mile and then it got lost.

211. Q. Was the Radar searching in any particular direction?

A. It was an all-round sweep. I kept asking for reports periodically, but he couldn't make out any ships from the ground wave.

WITNESS WITHDREW AND ELECTED TO REMAIN.

Evidence of Lieutenant Derrick Arthur Woodcroft, Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve (Temporary), of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "TROIS RIVIERES"

NAME: Lieutenant Derrick Arthur Woodcroft.

CALLED AND CAUTIONED.

212. Q. Are you Lieutenant Derrick Arthur Woodcroft, Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve (Temporary), of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "TROIS RIVIERES"?
- A. I am, Sir.
213. Q. Were you serving in His Majesty's Canadian Ship "TROIS RIVIERES" on the 26th day of June at the time of the collision?
- A. Yes, Sir.
214. Q. Will you give the Board a short account of anything you yourself saw or heard leading up to the collision?
- A. At approximately 0530P I was called to the bridge, and sent up to the fo'c's'le. We were then proceeding up channel. We passed some merchant ships on the port hand before we reached Neverfail. When we reached there we started stopping engines and listening and sounding "Z's" to attract the attention of the Examination Vessel. The first inkling I had of the collision was the appearance of a white light dead ahead which I reported. A few seconds later I heard a long blast from a steam siren in that direction. I reported a white light to the Captain, and after the long blast was sounded the forward lookout reported a ship dead ahead. The engines were stopped. When a ship was reported we went astern, and three short blasts were sounded. I told the forward lookout to get off the fo'c's'le and get off myself, and went to the gun depression rail where I watched the collision.
215. Q. Was the ship making headway at the time of the collision?
- A. It was going astern, Sir.
216. Q. Did you hear any other sound signals from ahead before the one long blast?
- A. The anchor bells from the other ships.
217. Q. Did the sound of the engines bother you up there?
- A. No, not as much as on the bridge.
218. Q. And you didn't hear any other signals?
- A. Just one long blast.

Evidence of Lieutenant Derrick Arthur Woodcroft, Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve (Temporary), of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "TROIS RIVIERES" - Continued.

219. Q. You say that the engines were stopped, half astern?

A. Yes.

220. Q. How do you know they were going half astern?

A. I heard the Captain give the order.

221. Q. You heard the order half astern?

A. Yes, Sir.

222. Q. You heard the order full astern?

A. No.

WITNESS WITHDREW AND ELECTED TO REMAIN.

Evidence of Commissioned Engineer Charles Earl Roach, Royal Canadian Naval Reserve (Temporary), of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "TROIS RIVIERES"

NAME: Commissioned Engineer Charles Earl Roach.

CALLED AND CAUTIONED.

223. Q. Are you Commissioned Engineer Charles Earl Roach, Royal Canadian Naval Reserve (Temporary), of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "TROIS RIVIERES"?

A. I am, Sir.

224. Q. Were you serving in His Majesty's Canadian Ship "TROIS RIVIERES" on the 26th day of June, at the time of the collision with His Majesty's Canadian Ship "WALLACEBURG"?

A. Yes, Sir.

225. Q. You are Engineer Officer of the ship?

A. Yes, Sir.

226. Q. Where were you at the time?

A. In the Engine Room, Sir.

227. Q. What orders did you receive immediately prior to the collision?

A. At 0555 I had half astern, on both port and starboard engines, and 0555 full astern, and then a double ring extra full astern.

Evidence of Commissioned Engineer Charles Earl Roach, Royal Canadian Naval Reserve (Temporary), of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "TROIS RIVIERES" - Continued.

228. Q. Was there any delay in carrying out those orders?
A. No, Sir.
229. Q. What was the normal complement in the Engine Room at the time?
A. Three--two motor mechanics, myself, and an oiler.
230. Q. What is the slowest speed ahead that your engines will do?
A. 125 revolutions.
231. Q. That is the minimum?
A. Yes, Sir.
232. Q. What speed does that give?
A. That will give you somewhere about five or six knots, Sir.

WITNESS WITHDREW AND ELECTED TO REMAIN.

Evidence of Arthur Douglas Hall, Acting Chief Petty Officer, Official Number A-1557, of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "TROIS RIVIERES".

NAME: Arthur Douglas Hall.

CALLED AND CAUTIONED

233. Q. Are you Arthur Douglas Hall, Acting Chief Petty Officer, Official Number A-1557, of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "TROIS RIVIERES"?
A. Yes, Sir.
234. Q. Were you serving in H.M.C.S. "TROIS RIVIERES" on the 26th of June, 1944, at the time of the collision with H.M.C.S. "WALLACEBURG"?
A. Yes, Sir.
235. Q. What were your duties at that time?
A. Coxswain at the wheel, Sir.
236. Q. You were at the wheel yourself?
A. Yes, Sir.
237. Q. I understand that the engines were stopped several times prior to the collision. Did the ship's head pay off much on these occasions?

Evidence of Arthur Douglas Hall, Acting Chief Petty Officer,
Official Number A-1557, of His Majesty's Canadian Ship
"TROIS RIVIERES" - Continued.

237. A. Yes, Sir, she went off to port.
238. Q. About how many degrees?
A. Well, it just depends on how long the engine was stopped. About ten degrees, Sir.
239. Q. Apart from that you were never off your course?
A. No, Sir, at the time the light was spotted we were on a steady course of 345.
240. Q. Were the telegraph orders passed through you?
A. No, Sir.
241. Q. They were passed separately?
A. Yes, Sir.
242. Q. Did you hear these orders?
A. Yes.
243. Q. What were they?
A. When the light was reported to the Captain, he immediately gave orders to stop engines, then immediately after that half astern and three short blasts, then full astern and three short blasts.
244. Q. Could you see the water?
A. You could see it going back all right, and she went up to port just before H.M.C.S. "WALLACEBURG" hit us.
245. Q. About how much did you pay off just before the collision?
A. About five degrees--just began to move off.

WITNESS WITHDREW AND ELECTED TO REMAIN.

Evidence of Wilmur Ash, Leading Signalman, Official Number
4096, of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "TROIS RIVIERES"

NAME: Wilmur Ash.

CALLED AND CAUTIONED.

246. Q. Are you Wilmur Ash, Leading Signalman, Official Number 4096, of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "TROIS RIVIERES"?
- A. Yes, Sir.

Evidence of Wilbur Ash, Leading Signaller, Official Number 4096,
of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "TROIS RIVIERES" - Continued.

247. Q. Were you serving in His Majesty's Canadian Ship "TROIS RIVIERES" on the 26th day of June, 1944, at the time of the collision with His Majesty's Canadian Ship "WALLACEBURG"?
- A. Yes, Sir.
248. Q. Will you give the Board an account of anything you saw or heard from the time of passing the Inner Automatic buoy up to the time of the collision?
- A. We were hearing whistles and bells from other ships.
249. Q. Did you hear any sound signals from ahead?
- A. Yes, Sir. One long blast seemed quite close and the Captain put the engines half astern.
250. Q. Immediately before the collision?
- A. Yes, Sir, he put half astern on his engines and gave three short blasts. There were two short blasts from ahead and he put his engines full astern. They were not answered immediately, so he put them full astern again.
251. Q. Prior to the first long blast you had not heard any other sound signals from ahead?
- A. Not close enough to be dangerous.
252. Q. You had heard some?
- A. Not right ahead.
253. Q. Did they appear before the beam?
- A. Yes, Sir.
254. Q. How long before the collision?
- A. I would say a minute or two before. They had been reported on Radar on one side of the beam there.
255. Q. Did you notice the sound signals made from your own ship?
- A. Yes, Sir.
256. Q. What were they?
- A. They were two groups of three short blasts, Sir. Before that we were sounding long blasts when the engines were stopped.
257. Q. Anything else?
- A. That was all from our ships. We were calling the gate vessel in between times.

Evidence of Wilmur Ash, Leading Signalman, Official Number 4096,
of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "TROIS RIVIERES" - Continued.

258. Q. How long before the collision?
- A. Shortly before the collision.
259. Q. Would there have been any chance of mistaking those signals?
- A. No, Sir.
260. Q. Do I understand you were using a different whistle for the "Z's" and for the other sound signals?
- A. No, Sir; the same, Sir.

WITNESS WITHDREW.

Evidence of Lieutenant William Grant Garden, Royal Canadian
Naval Volunteer Reserve (Temporary), Commanding Officer of
His Majesty's Canadian Ship "TROIS RIVIERES" - RECALLED -

261. Q. Have you anything further to add?
- A. We were waiting quite close to Litchfield buoy for the Examination Vessel to return. We were told we would have to wait for "D", so we waited for some time. We blew for him several times, and eventually he came out and asked us why we hadn't gone on--he had been blowing our pendants, why didn't we answer? It was apparent that the fog was so thick that it was impossible to hear some of the sound signals. The X.V. had been then a short distance from us and had been blowing our pendants, and we couldn't hear him at all. This was after the collision.

WITNESS WITHDREW AND ELECTED TO REMAIN.

Evidence of Lieutenant Commander Robert Auburn Stewart MacNeil,
O.B.E., Royal Canadian Naval Reserve (Temporary), Commanding
Officer of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "WALLACEBURG" - RECALLED.

262. Q. Do you recall a long blast from a ship astern?
- A. From one of our own ships--in our group, do you mean? I don't, Sir. In view of the considerable discrepancies in the sound signals, I would suggest that witnesses be called from the Gate Vessel and the Examination Vessel. We were in direct contact with the Examination Vessel--with the X.V. We also heard several "Z's" from a steam whistle.
263. Q. Could you tell from what direction?
- A. Roughly ahead of us.
264. Q. What time was this?
- A. Just past Mars Rock. This was a merchant ship who

Evidence of Lieutenant Commander Robert Auburn Stewart MacNeil,
O.B.E., Royal Canadian Naval Reserve (Temporary), Commanding
Officer of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "WALLACEBURG" - RECALLED
- Continued.

264. A. (continued)...nearly ran us down. After he got stopped, he started blowing "Z's" too.
265. Q. On the whole, were the sound signals in your opinion carrying more or less evenly, or could they be heard much better sometimes than others?
- A. We heard them quite consistently. With this prevailing wind, we could hear them better than H.M.C.S. "TROIS RIVIERES".
266. Q. From the sound signals you did definitely hear from H.M.C.S. "TROIS RIVIERES", did they appear to be quite distinctive and different from other sound signals you heard that morning?
- A. At the time, I took it to be an M.L.
267. Q. It was not a steam whistle, and could not be mistaken for one?
- A. No, Sir, it was quite clear.

WITNESS WITHDREW.

BOARD ADJOURNED AT 1210.

John Kirkpatrick

LIEUTENANT, ROYAL CANADIAN NAVAL VOLUNTEER MEMBER
RESERVE (TEMPORARY)

James Holan

LIEUTENANT, ROYAL CANADIAN NAVAL RESERVE MEMBER
(TEMPORARY)

William Mitchell

ACTING LIEUTENANT COMMANDER, ROYAL CANADIAN MEMBER
NAVAL VOLUNTEER RESERVE (TEMPORARY)

[Signature]

ACTING COMMANDER, ROYAL CANADIAN NAVY (Comp.) PRESIDENT

DATE : TIME : ORDER :

June 26 0316 280
 " 0326 220
 " 0355 S.H.
 " 0358 H.H.

June 26 0454 S.H.
 " 0455 S.
 " 0456 S.S.
 " 0457 S.

June 26 0514½ S.S.
 " 0515 S.
 " 0528 S.S.
 " 0529 S.

June 26 0555 H.S.
 " 0555½ F.S. (Double full)
 " 0555½ S.
 " 0559 S.S.
 " 0559½ S.S.

June 26 0646 S.S.
 " 0646½ S.
 " 0647 S.H.

June 26 0651 S.

DATE : TIME : ORDER : DATE : TIME : ORDER : DATE : TIME : ORDER

June 25 2320 220
 " 26 0100 200
 " " 0106 220
 " " 0221 200

June 26 0419 S.
 " 0420 S.H.
 " 0420½ S.
 " 0421 S.H.

June 26 0455 S.
 " 0456 S.S.
 " 0457 S.
 " 0504½ S.H.

June 26 0534 S.
 " 0534½ S.H.
 " 0544 S.
 " 0545 S.H.

Hit something (H.M.G.S. "WALLACEBURG") at 0555½ while going full astern.

June 26 0559 S.S.
 " 0559 S.

June 26 0618 S.S.
 " 0619 S.
 " 0646 S.S.

June 26 0226 150
 " 0253 190
 " 0309 220
 " 0316 280

June 26 0429 S.
 " 0433 S.H.
 " 0434 S.
 " 0436½ S.H.

June 26 0505 S.
 " 0505½ S.S.
 " 0510 S.
 " 0514½ S.S.

June 26 0547 S.
 " 0549 S.H.
 " 0549½ S.
 " 0552 S.H.

June 26 0602 S.S.
 " 0603½ S.
 " 0613 S.S.

June 26 0641½ S.
 " 0648 S.H.
 " 0648 H.H.

June 26 0326 220
 " 0325 S.H.
 " 0358 H.H.
 " 0415 S.H.

June 26 0437 S.
 " 0439 S.H.
 " 0440½ S.
 " 0454 S.H.

June 26 0515 S.
 " 0521½ S.H.
 " 0522½ S.
 " 0533 S.S.

June 26 0554½ S.
 " 0555 H.S.
 " 0555 F.S. (Double full)
 " 0555½ S.

June 26 0613½ S.
 " 0615 S.S.
 " 0616 S.

June 26 0648½ S.H.
 " 0648½ S.
 " 0651 S.H.

Excerpt from "Supplementary Rough Engine-Room Register"
 of H.M.C.S. "TROI RIVIERES"

DATE	TIME	ORDER	DATE	TIME	ORDER	DATE	TIME	ORDER
June 25	2203	225	June 26	0221	200	June 26	0316	280
"	2220	220	"	0226	150	"	0326	220
June 26	0100	200	"	0253	190	"	0355	S.H.
"	0106	220	"	0309	220	"	0358	H.H.
June 26	0415	S.H.	June 26	0421	S.H.	June 26	0454	S.H.
"	0419	S.	"	0429	S.	"	0455	S.
"	0420	S.H.	"	0440	S.S.	"	0456	S.S.
"	0420½	S.	"	0440½	S.	"	0457	S.
June 26	0503	S.H.	June 26	0507	S.H.	June 26	0514½	S.S.
"	0503½	S.	"	0507½	S.	"	0515	S.
"	0504	S.H.	"	0508½	S.H.	"	0528	S.S.
"	0505	S.	"	0510	S.	"	0529	S.
June 26	0533½	S.H.	June 26	0549	S.H.	June 26	0555	H.S. (Double full)
"	0544	S.	"	0549½	S.	"	0555½	S.
"	0544	S.H.	"	0552	S.H.	"	0559	S.S.
"	0547	S.	"	0554½	S.	"	0559½	S.S.
June 26			June 26			June 26		
"	0602	S.S.	"	0613½	S.	"	0646	S.S.
"	0603½	S.	"	0615	S.S.	"	0646½	S.
"	0613	S.S.	"	0616	S.	"	0647	S.H.
June 26	0648	S.	June 26	0648½	S.H.	June 26	0651	S.
"	0648	S.H.	"	0648½	S.	"		
"	0648	H.H.	"	0649	S.H.	"		

DATE	TIME	ORDER	DATE	TIME	ORDER
June 25	2320	220	June 26	0100	200
"	0106	220	"	0106	220
"	0221	200	"	0221	200
June 26	0419	S.	June 26	0419	S.
"	0420	S.H.	"	0420	S.H.
"	0420½	S.	"	0420½	S.
"	0421	S.H.	"	0421	S.H.
June 26	0455	S.	June 26	0455	S.
"	0456	S.S.	"	0456	S.S.
"	0457	S.	"	0457	S.
"	0504½	S.H.	"	0504½	S.H.
June 26	0534	S.	June 26	0534	S.
"	0534½	S.H.	"	0534½	S.H.
"	0544	S.	"	0544	S.
"	0545	S.H.	"	0545	S.H.
Hit something (H.M.C.S. "WALLACEBURG") at					
June 26			June 26		
"	0559	S.S.	"	0559	S.S.
"	0559	S.	"	0559	S.
June 26	0618	S.S.	June 26	0618	S.S.
"	0619	S.	"	0619	S.
"	0646	S.S.	"	0646	S.S.

Excerpt from Navigating Officer's Note Book

(S.548A), of H.M.C.S. "WALLACEBURG"

H.T. - 01.04 - 5.8' - High water
0302 Slipped French Cable Wharf
CO 170 deg.
0306 130 deg. - 60 revs. 18 min.
CO 157 deg.
0355 Abeam George Island (0442)
a/c to 157 deg.
0403 Abeam Pier B
0434 Passed through gate
0441 Increased to 120 revs.
0442 a/c 172 deg.
Heard bell buoy.
Litchfield Shoal whistle buoy.
0451 a/c 155 deg. (T)
0452 in collision with ship. Three Rivers.

Echo sounder
10 - 11 fathoms
0535 Merchantman in sight.
0542 Shackle out.
0548 70 revs. course 355 deg. ↓
0551 abeam Neverfail

Dan buoy dropped 120 deg. from Neverfail
by Three Rivers
0600 90 revs.
0605 a/c 339 deg.
0616 passed gate in.
0620 abeam Middle buoy, ground buoy
L.T. 7.07 1.7 Low water
0636 abeam George Island
0642 abeam Ferry Wharf
✓ a/c 313 deg.

DATE	TIME (Port)	ORDER (Stbd)	DATE	TIME (Port)	ORDER (Stbd)	Initials of Watch- keeper	DATE	TIME (Port)	ORDER (Stbd)	Initials of Watch- keeper
			0430	H.A.H.	H.A.H.		0654	S.H.		
			0440	120	120		0654		S.A.	
			0443	Stop	Stop		0655		S.	
			0443	F.S.	F.S.	W.M.	0655	S.		H.W.
			0443	Stop	Stop		0655	F.W.E.	F.W.E.	
			0544	F.S.	F.S.					
			0544		Stop					
			0545	Stop		W.M.				
			0545	H.H.	H.H.					
			0546	Stop	Stop					
			0547	H.H.	H.H.					
			0548	90	90	W.M.				
			0549	70	70					
			0550	S.H.	S.H.					
			0551	H.H.	H.H.					
			0555	90	90	W.M.				
			0646	S.H.	S.H.					
			0650	S.	S.					
			0651		S.A.					
			0652		H.A.	H.W.				
			0652		S.					
			0653		S.A.					
			0654		S.	H.W.				
June 26										
0257	St.By	St.By								
0301	S.H.	S.H.								
0302	60	60								
0334	S.	S.								
0334	S.A.	S.A.								
0335	S.	S.								
0335	S.H.	S.H.								
0339	35	35								
0355	45	45								

Excerpt from "Supplementary Rough Engine-Room Register"
 of H.M.C.S. "WALLACEBURG"

Nfld. TO: HALIFAX and at HALIFAX

Corrected :
 Barometric : Temperature °F.
 Pressure in : Dry : Wet : Sea
 Millibars : Bulb ; Bulb :

29.65 54 54

29.65 54 54

29.65 58 58

29.64 56 56

0100 Ahead S.S. Imperoil - distance $1\frac{1}{2}$ - 2 miles.
 0200 Ahead Imperoil. 0303 Abeam #6 Light Vessel.
 0325 Abeam D Buoy. 0353 Slow ahead - ship passed to starboard.
 0357 Half ahead 225 Revs. 0414 Slow ahead Revs. to 0.
 0419 Stop both. 0420 Slow ahead. 0421 "A" buoy abeam starboard.
 CO. 343°. 0429 Stop both - in vicinity Inner Automatic. (A.S.D.)
 0400 Relieved by Mr. Ferguson and Dawson. 0532 Slow ahead both. CO 333° (WJT)
 0542 Stop both. 0543 Slow ahead. CO 345°. (A.S.D.)
 0545 Stop both, in vicinity Neverfail Buoy. 0547 Slow ahead. 0547½ Stop both. 0550 Slow ahead.
 0552½ White light ahead. Stop both, half astern both, 3 short blasts.
 0553 Full astern both 3 short blasts (twice). 0553½ In head on collision
 with H.M.C.S. "WALLACEBURG". Starboard anchor caught in WALLACEBURG's bow, cable run out.
 Stop both. 0557 Slow astern both. Stop both. 0600 to 0645 Manoeuvring
 with WALLACEBURG, ships both trying to free cable - 2 red lights hoisted, one
 of which burnt out. 0645 Slipped cable at "weak plate" - cable marked
 by Dan buoy and flag - Down N.U.C. lights. 0646 Slow ahead both.
 0650 to 0750 Contacting XV in vicinity Mars Rock and awaiting "D". 0751 Received (SMF)
 "D", slow ahead both, proceeding engines alternately stopped and slow ahead
 in thick fog. 0807 Entered gate, course 345°. 0822 Ives Knoll abeam starboard.
 CO. 350. 0837½ Let go port anchor. 0842 Anchored S.E. Geo. Is. - 2 shackles.
 1030 Set clocks to 0930P.

29.73 58 58

29.73 58 58

Excerpt from Log Book of H.M.C.S. "TROIS RIVERES"

H.M.C.S. "TROIS RIVIERES"

Monday, 26 June, 1944

FROM: ST. JOHN'S, Nfld. TO: HALIFAX and at HALIFAX

Time	:Mean :Revs. :per :min.	:True :Course	:Gyro :Compass :Course	:Stand. :Compass :Course	:Devia- :tion	:Varia- :tion	:Direction :(true)	:Force :(0-12)	:Weather: :and :Visibi- :lity	:Sea :and :Swell	:Corrected :Barometric :Pressure in :Millibars	:Temperature °F.		
												:Dry :Bulb	:Wet :Bulb	:Sea
0100	Var.	250	250	--	2E	25W	S.E.	1	F-2	12	29.65	54	54	
0200	Var.	257	257	--	2E	25W	S.E.	1	F-2	12	29.65	54	54	
0300	Var.	257	257	--	2E	25W	S.E.	1	F-2	12	29.65	58	58	
0400	Var.	294	294	--	2E	25W	S.E.	1	F-2	12	29.64	56	56	
0500							S.E.		F-1	01				
0600							S.S.E.		F-1	01				
0700							S.S.E.		F-1	01				
0800							S.S.E.		F-1	01				
0900							S.S.E.		F-1	01				
1000														
1100							S.S.E.		F-2		29.73	58	58	
1200							S.S.E.		F-3		29.73	58	58	

0100 Ahead S.S. Imperoil - distant
0200 Ahead Imperoil. 0303 Abeam
0325 Abeam D Buoy. 0353 Slow ahead
0357 Half ahead 225 Revs. 0414 S
0419 Stop both. 0420 Slow ahead.
CO. 343°. 0429 Stop both - in vi
0400 Relieved by Mr. Ferguson an
0542 Stop both. 0543 Slow ahead.
0545 Stop both, in vicinity Never
0552½ White light ahead. Stop bot
0553 Full astern both 3 short bla
with H.M.C.S. "WALLACEBURG". Sta
Stop both. 0557 Slow astern bot
with WALLACEBURG, ships both try
of which burnt out. 0645 Slipped
by Dan buoy and flag - Down N.U.
0650 to 0750 Contacting XV in vi
"D", slow ahead both, proceeding
in thick fog. 0807 Entered gate
CO. 350. 0837½ Let go port anch
1030 Set clocks to 0930P.

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TITLE/TITRE : <i>[Commander in Chief, Canadian Northwest Atlantic] - Boards/Courts of Inquiry - Collision between HMCS WALLACEBURG and HMCS THREE RIVERS</i>
FILE/DOSSIER : <i>File number: 55-2-1/433</i>
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